1、Limited-liability, privately owned joint-stock companies are the core institutions of modern capitalism. These entities are largely responsible for or1rganising the production and distribution of goods and services across the globe. Their role is both cause and consequence of the revolution in the s

2、c2ale and diversity of economic activity that has taken place over the past two centuries. 有限責(zé)任、私人所有的股份公司是現(xiàn)代資本主義的核心機(jī)構(gòu)。這些實(shí)體在很大程度上承擔(dān)起組織全球范圍內(nèi)商品和服務(wù)的生產(chǎn)和分配職責(zé)。3它們的角色既是過(guò)去兩個(gè)世紀(jì)發(fā)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)在規(guī)模和多元性方面革命的原因，也是其結(jié)果。 Almost nothing in economics is more important than thinking through how companies should be managed and f

3、or 4what ends. Unfortunately, we have made a mess of this. That mess has a name: it is “shareholder value maximisation”. Operating companies in line with 5this belief not only leads to misbehaviour but may also militate against their true social aim, which is to generate greater prosperity. 在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中，幾乎

4、沒(méi)有比思考6明白該如何、以及出于何種目的管理公司更重要的了。遺憾的是，我們搞砸了這種思考，得出了糟糕的結(jié)論，那就是“股東價(jià)值最大化”。按照這種理念經(jīng)營(yíng)公司不僅會(huì)導(dǎo)致不當(dāng)行為，而且還會(huì)妨礙它們實(shí)現(xiàn)真正的社會(huì)目標(biāo)，即創(chuàng)造更大的繁榮。 I am not the first person to worry about 7the joint-stock company. Adam Smith, founder of modern economics, argued: “Negligence and profusion.must always prevail,8 more or less, in the

5、management of the affairs of such a company.” His concern is over what we call the “agency problem” the difficulty of monitori9ng management. Others complain that companies behave like psychopaths: a company aiming at maximising shareholder value might conclude it would be pro10fitable and so perhap

6、s even its duty to pollute the air and water if allowed to do so. It might also use its resources to obstruct an appropriate 11regulatory response to such (mis) behaviour. 我并非是第一個(gè)對(duì)股份公司感到憂慮的?，F(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)創(chuàng)始人亞當(dāng)斯密(Adam Smith)指出：“玩忽職守和揮霍浪費(fèi)或多或少總是會(huì)在這類公司的管理過(guò)程中盛行?！彼麚?dān)心的是我們所稱的“代理人問(wèn)題”，即12監(jiān)督管理層的困難。另一些人抱怨稱，公司的行為就像精神病患者：

7、一家旨在實(shí)現(xiàn)股東價(jià)值最大化的公司可能認(rèn)為，如果允許的話，污染空氣和水將是合算的，或許這還是它的職責(zé)。它還可能利用自己的資源來(lái)阻礙監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)此類（不當(dāng)）行為作出適當(dāng)回應(yīng)。 The economic argument for sharehold13er value maximisation and control is that, while all other stakeholders are protected by contract, shareholders are not. They therefore bear the resid14ual risk. This being so, t

8、hey need to control the company in order to align the interests of management with their own. Only then would they be prepar15ed to make risky investments. 股東價(jià)值最大化和股東控制的經(jīng)濟(jì)理由是，其他所有利益相關(guān)者都受到合同的保護(hù)，但股東們沒(méi)有。他們因此承擔(dān)了“剩余風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。有鑒于此，他們需要控制公司以便讓管理層利益與他們自己的利益相一致。只有這樣，他們才愿意進(jìn)行高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資。 Yet, whil16e shareholders do inde

9、ed bear risks in their role as the insurers of solvency, they are not the only stakeholders to do so. A host of others are also 17exposed to risks against which they cannot be fully protected by contract: long-term workers; long-term suppliers; and, not least, the jurisdictions i18n which companies

10、operate. Moreover, shareholders, unlike others, and particularly employees, can hedge their risks by diversifying their portfolios. 19A worker cannot normally work for many companies at the same time and nobody can hedge employee income by owning shares in other people, except via ta20 xation. 然而，盡管

11、股東的確因“償付承保人”的角色而承擔(dān)了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但他們并非是承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的唯一利益相關(guān)者。其他許多人也暴露在無(wú)法得到合同充分保護(hù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之下：長(zhǎng)期員工，長(zhǎng)期供應(yīng)商，以及更為重要的，公司經(jīng)營(yíng)地所屬的司法管轄地。此外，與其他人（尤其是員工）不同，股東可以通過(guò)多元化投資組合來(lái)對(duì)沖他們的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)21。員工通常無(wú)法同時(shí)為許多公司工作，也沒(méi)有人可以通過(guò)擁有其他人的股份來(lái)對(duì)沖薪資收入，除了通過(guò)稅收以外。 The doctrine of shareholder value maximisation has allowed us to believe that the existence of thes22e long-li

12、ved, hierarchical and powerful entities has not changed the market economy fundamentally. But, as Colin Mayer of Oxfords Sad Business 23School argues in his splendid book, Firm Commitment, this approach also misses the true purpose of the company. 股東價(jià)值最大化的信條讓我們相信，這些長(zhǎng)期存續(xù)、等級(jí)分明的強(qiáng)大實(shí)體的存在，沒(méi)有24從根本上改變市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)。但

13、正如牛津大學(xué)(Oxford)賽德商學(xué)院(Sad Business School)的科林邁耶(Colin Mayer)在其精彩著作堅(jiān)定承諾(Firm Commitment)中論述的那樣，這種看法也忽視了公司的真正目的。 Companies, arg25ues Professor Mayer, are a mechanism for sustaining long-term commitments. But such commitments will only work if it is costly for the parties to act 26opportunistically. More

14、over, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves not to behave in such a way. But, with an active market in27 corporate control, such commitments cannot be made. Those who make the promises may disappear before they can deliver. 邁耶表示，公司是一種維持長(zhǎng)期承諾的機(jī)制。但此類承諾只有在相關(guān)28方采取機(jī)會(huì)主義行動(dòng)代價(jià)高昂的時(shí)候才會(huì)有

15、效。此外，約束自己不采取機(jī)會(huì)主義行動(dòng)通常也符合所有人的利益。但由于公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)非?；钴S，相關(guān)方不可能做出此類承諾。那些做出承諾的，可能在履行承諾之前就會(huì)消失。 These commitments take the form of implicit or n29ot fully specified contracts. Why do we have to rely on implicit contracts? Long-term commitments could in theory be managed instead by trying to sp30ecify every eventua

16、lity. About a seconds thought makes it clear that this is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly. It wo31uld come up against the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have little idea of what might happen in the next few months, let alone the next few decades32. If people are

17、to make long-term commitments, trust is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seems profitable today can be trust33ed only to renege on implicit contracts. It is sure to act opportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so, they would be replaced. This is b34ecause, as P

18、rof Mayer argues: “The corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareh35older returns reinforces the opportunism. 這些承諾以隱性（或不完全明確的）合同形式存在。我們?yōu)楹尾坏貌灰蕾囯[性合同？就理論而言，我們可以通過(guò)努力明確所有可能性來(lái)管理長(zhǎng)期承諾。但稍微想一下就知道這是不可能的。不僅其復(fù)雜性和成本會(huì)高到難以想象，而且還會(huì)遇到不確定36性的更深層次問(wèn)題

19、。我們連今后幾個(gè)月將會(huì)發(fā)生什么事都不知道，更別說(shuō)今后幾十年了。而如果人們要做出長(zhǎng)期承諾，信任是唯一的選擇。但對(duì)于一家今天只以不擇手段盈利為目標(biāo)的公司，人們只能相信它必將背棄隱性合同。它肯定會(huì)采取機(jī)會(huì)主義的行為。如果它的經(jīng)理們不想這么做，他們就會(huì)被替換掉。正如邁耶指出的那樣，這是因?yàn)椋?7“對(duì)最短期的股東來(lái)說(shuō)，企業(yè)是一個(gè)抽租工具?！睂⒐芾韺营?jiǎng)勵(lì)與股東回報(bào)掛鉤強(qiáng)化了這種機(jī)會(huì)主義。 In practice, many capitalist economies do mitigate the risks of shareholder value maximisation and the m38arke

20、t in corporate control. This is true of continental Europe, notably German companies. But it is also, notes Prof Mayer, true in the US, where the 39idea that management should be protected against shareholders is widely accepted in practice, if not so much in theory. The country that has taken the40

21、 idea furthest is the UK. 在實(shí)踐中，許多資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)體的確減輕了股東價(jià)值最大化和公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。歐洲大陸就是如此，尤其是德國(guó)公司。但邁耶指出，美國(guó)同樣如此在美國(guó)，人們普遍在實(shí)踐中認(rèn)可應(yīng)防止管理層遭受股東侵害的觀點(diǎn)（理論上則接受程度較低）。最大程度接受這種觀點(diǎn)的國(guó)家41是英國(guó)。 Prof Mayer argues rightly: “The defect of existing economic models of the corporation is in not recognising its distinguishing feature the fact42 that it is a separate legal entity. The significance of this stems from the fact that it is thereby capable of sustaining arrangements that are disti43nct from those that its owners, its shareholders, are able to ach