JOINT

ResearchPapersNo.4

November2021

NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssets

KristiRaik

Contributingauthors:

KristineBerzina,IvoJuurvee,

TonyLawrenceandMauriceTurner

ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementN.959143.

Thispublicationreflectsonlytheviewoftheauthor(s)andtheEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.

NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssets

Leadauthor:KristiRaik

Contributingauthors:KristineBerzina,IvoJuurvee,TonyLawrenceandMauriceTurner*

Abstract

Inthepastdecades,theEUhasdevelopedanincreasinglybroad,multi-sectoralsetofforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments.AllofthesecanberelevantinsustainingtheEU’scrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Whiletryingtocreateamoreeffectiveandintegratedtoolbox,theUnionhasfacedanumberofchallenges.First,astheEU’sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthenthe“harderend”ofinstruments–includingmilitary,cyberandintelligencetools–hasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweak.Second,withEUpoliciesextendingtoareaswheretheUnion’sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstates’resourceshasbecomemoreimportant,butensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstateshasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoeachothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.

KristiRaikisDirectoroftheEstonianForeignPolicyInstituteattheInternationalCentrefor

DefenceandSecurity(ICDS).KristineBerzinaisSeniorFellowandHeadoftheGeopoliticsTeamattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates(GMF).Ivo

JuurveeisHeadofSecurity&ResilienceProgrammeattheICDS.TonyLawrenceisHeadofDefencePolicyandStrategyProgrammeattheICDS.MauriceTurnerisCybersecurityFellowattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGMF.TheauthorsaregratefultoStevenBlockmans,ZachPaikinandDylanMacchiariniCrossonfromCEPSandPolBarguésfromCIDOBfortheirthoroughandinsightfulcommentsonearlierversionsofthepaper.

JOINTResearchPapersNo.4 2

Introduction

ThefirstforeignpolicytoolsoftheEuropeanUniondatebacktothecreationoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1957,whichestablishedcommonexternaleconomicpolicieswithastrongsupranationalcompetence.Thiswastraditionallyseenasthetechnical,“l(fā)owpolitics”areaofexternalrelations,asopposedtothe“highpolitics”ofsensitiveforeignandsecuritypolicymatterswherememberstateswerekeentomaintainanintergovernmentalapproach.1Foreignpolicycoordinationamongmemberstatesincreasedfromthe1970s,butaleaptoamoreinstitutionalised–yetstillintergovernmental–CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)wasonlymadewiththeMaastrichtTreatysignedin1992.ThenewmomentumwasinitiatedbydramaticchangesintheinternationalenvironmentthatcreatedbothnewspaceandaneedforastrongerEuropeanapproachtoregionalsecuritymatters,whichwasmostpainfullyunderscoredbythewarsinformerYugoslavia.

Sincethe1990s,theUnionhasbeengraduallystrengtheningthe“higher”and“harder”endofEUforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments,therebybecominganincreasinglymulti-sectoralforeignpolicyactor.Duringthepastdecade,thechanginginternationalenvironmenthasyetagaincreatednewdemands,astheworldhasbecomemoremulti-polar,uncertaintyabouttheUnitedStates’commitmenttoEuropeansecurityhasgrown,instabilityintheEU’simmediateneighbourhoodhasincreased,andsecurityrisksandthreatshavebecomemorecomplexandmanifold.InthewordsofHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyJosepBorrell,thishascreatedtheneedfortheEUto“l(fā)earntousethelanguageofpower”2–whichimpliesthenecessitytodevelopitsforeignpolicytoolsaccordingly.TheEUhasmadeeffortstostrengthenitsmilitarycapabilitiesintheframeworkoftheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)launchedin1999,whileadditionaltoolshavebeencreatedtoaddressnewthreatsinareassuchascybersecurityanddisinformation.TheEUhasthusconstructedan

1StanleyHoffmann,“TheEuropeanProcessatAtlanticCrosspurposes”,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.3,No.1(1964),p.85-101.

2JosepBorrellFontelles,Openingstatement,HearingattheCommitteeonForeignAffairsoftheEuropeanParliament,Brussels,7October2019,

https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/

hearing-of-josep-borrell-fontelles-high-representative-vice-president-designate-of-the-european-

commission-opening-statement_I178140-V_v.

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increasinglycomplextoolboxcomposedofnumerouscompartmentsgovernedbydifferentinstitutionalarrangementsanddecision-makingprocedures,wherebytheEUforeignandsecuritypolicy(EUFSP)hasexpandedbeyondtherelativelylimiteddiplomatic-militaryremitoftheCFSP/CSDP.Howtomobilisethedifferentinstrumentsandapplytheminaconcertedmannerhasbecomeanincreasinglypressingandcomplicatedquestiontoanswer.

ThisreportaimstounpackthiscomplexitybyexploringhowandwhyEUFSPhasbecomemoremulti-sectoraloverthepastdecades.ItfocusesonpolicytoolsthatsustainEUcrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Followingtheintroduction,thesecondpartofthereportanalysestheinternalandexternalfactorsthathaveshapedthedevelopmentofamoremulti-sectoralEUFSPandthenprovidesanoverviewandassessmentoftwokeyareas:diplomacyandcrisismanagement.Thethirdpartwilltakeacloserlookataselectionofmorerecentanddynamicinstrumentsinthreefields:military,cybersecurityandintelligencecapabilities,whichareallvitalfortheEU’sabilitytomanagecontemporaryconflictsandcrises.Finally,thereportdrawsconclusionsonthesuccessesandfailuresofamulti-sectoralapproach,highlightingthreechallengesidentifiedwhileanalysingtheevolutionoftheinstruments.First,astheEU’sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthenthe“harderend”ofinstrumentshasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweakcomparedtotheEU’ssoft,civilian/non-coercivetools.Second,duetogrowing“multi-sectorness”extendingtoareaswheretheEU’sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstates’resourcesandcooperateandcoordinatewithotheractorshasbecomemoreimportantbutensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstatesinparticularhasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoeachothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.

Conceptualisation,overviewandassessmentoftheincreasinglymulti-sectoralEUFSP

1.1Internalandexternalpressuretowardsgrowingmulti-sectorness

Thegrowingmulti-sectornessofEUFSPduringthepastdecadescanbeexplained

byaninterplayofinternalandexternalfactors.Internally,deepeningintegration

4-NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssets

hasbroughtnewpolicyareastotheEU’sagendaandgraduallyextendedEUcompetenciesinareastraditionallybelongingtotherealmofnationalsovereignty.Sincethe1950s,thisprocesshasattimesaccelerated,andattimesstoodstill,butoverall,onecanarguethattherehasbeenafunctionalistlogicofintegrationextendingfromonesectortoanother,withspill-overeffectstriggeringfurthercooperation.Forexample,economicandtradeintegrationhadimplicationsformemberstates’relationswiththirdcountries,contributingtoclosercoordinationoftheirforeignandsecuritypolicies.IthasalsobeenarguedthatforeignpolicyintegrationhasfollowedthelogicofinternalfunctionalityinthesenseofbeingavehicleforfurtherevolutionoftheEuropeanproject.3

Whiletheinternallogicoffunctionalityhaspushedintegrationforward,theprinciplesofintergovernmentalismandnationalsovereigntyhaveremainedstrongintherealmofforeignandsecuritypolicy,whichisvisibleinthedevelopmentofEUFSPinstruments.EveninthemostintegratedaspectoftheEU’sexternalrelations,trade,thegrowingcomplexityandstrongerpoliticalaspectsoftradeagreementshavemadeitmoredifficulttogaintheapprovalofallmemberstatesfornewdeals.Inthefieldofdiplomacy,foreignpolicyintegrationhasnotreducedmemberstates’investmentintheirowndiplomatictools(e.g.diplomaticstaffandnetworksofembassies)whichinthecaseoflargermemberstatesisfarlargerthantheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)thatcomprisesthediplomaticarmoftheEU.4EUforeignpolicycanbeseentoentailboththepoliciesinstitutionalisedattheEUlevelandnationalforeignpolicies,althoughinpracticememberstates’actionsarenotalwaysalignedwithwhathasbeencommonlyagreedattheEUlevel.NationalinstrumentscanbeappliedtothebenefitoftheEUasawhole,forexample,withmemberstatesallocatingpartoftheirdevelopmentcooperationfundsthroughtheEU.Furthermore,onsomeoccasions,nationalforeignministershaveconductednegotiationswiththirdcountriesonbehalfoftheUnion.However,thereisavastunusedpotentialinactuallymakingmemberstates’foreignpolicyinstrumentsavailabletotheEUandusingthemtoimplementjointlyagreedEUpolicies.

3ChristopherJ.Bickerton,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy:FromEffectivenesstoFunctionality,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,2011.

4RosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik,“Conclusions:AdaptationtotheEUortotheChangingGlobalContext?”,inRosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik(eds),TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceandNationalForeignMinistries.ConvergenceorDivergence?,Farnham,Ashgate,2015,p.197.

5-NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssets

ThetensionbetweensupranationalandintergovernmentalelementsofEUFSP,andpossiblewaystomovebeyondthedichotomy,hasbeenextensivelycoveredinearlierstudies.5However,thedichotomyremainsvisibleinthedifferentinstitutionalstructuresandpolicy-makingproceduresindifferentareasofEUFSP.Theinstitutionalandproceduralcomplexityisanimportantfeatureofthemulti-sectornessofEUFSPthatreducesitsconsistencyandeffectiveness.NewmeasurestoimproveconsistencyandcoordinationhavebeenintroducedwithtreatychangessinceMaastricht,especiallywiththeLisbonTreatythatcreatedtheEuropeanExternalActionService.6Yetcoordinationamonginstitutions,notablytheEEASandtheCommission,andbetweentheEUandnationalinstitutionsremainedamajorchallenge.7

Externally,thechanginginternationalenvironmenthascreatednewdemandsandopportunitiesforastrongerEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Inthe1970s,Europeanforeignpolicycoordinationwasenhancedintheshadowofbipolarcompetitionbetweenthetwosuperpowersofthetime,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Quiteliketoday,Europeans–especiallytheFrench–weremotivatedtopursueamoreindependentforeignpolicythatwasnotalwaysinagreementwiththeUnitedStates(withvisibletensionsinthetransatlanticrelationshipoverissuessuchastheMiddleEast,AfghanistanandPoland).8

ThecollapseoftheEasternblocandtheendoftheColdWarcreatedanentirelynewexternalenvironmentwheretheEUandtheUnitedStatesagreedonthestrategicgoalstoreunifyEuropeandextendliberaldemocracyandmarketeconomytotheformerEasternbloc,whiletheEUhadanindispensableroletoplay

5E.g.,ibid.;JosepBátora,“The‘MitrailleuseEffect’:TheEEASasanInterstitialOrganizationandtheDynamicsofInnovationinDiplomacy”,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.51,No.4(July2013),p.598-613;JolyonHoworth,“Decision-MakinginSecurityandDefensePolicy:TowardsSupranationalInter-Governmentalism?”,inCooperationandConflict,Vol.47,No.4(December2012),p.433-453.

6Jean-ClaudePiris,TheLisbonTreaty:ALegalandPoliticalAnalysis,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010.

7ChristopheHillionandStevenBlockmans,FromSelf-DoubttoSelf-Assurance.TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceastheIndispensableSupportforaGeopoliticalEU,Brussels,CEPS/SIEPS/FES,January2021,

https://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2021/from-self-doubt-to-self-assurance

.

8HazelSmith,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy.WhatItIsandWhatItDoes,London/Sterling,PlutoPress,2002,p.127-135.

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inpursuingthesegoals.Atthesametime,thewarsinformerYugoslaviaandthefragilesecuritysituationinmanyotherpartsoftheformerEasternbloccalledforastrongerEUcontributiontoEuropeansecuritybeyondtheUnion’sborders.ThisnewcontextcontributedtotheestablishmentoftheCFSPandtheemergenceofenlargementasamajor,aswellasdistinctlymulti-sectoral,foreignpolicytoolfocusedonsecuringdemocracy,stabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinEurope.

Thenewpost-ColdWarenvironmentalsoexplainstheriseofcrisismanagementasamajorpriorityofCSDP,withthefirstmissionslocatedintheWesternBalkans.Furthermore,thespecificshapeofEUcrisismanagement,withafocusonciviliantoolsandlong-terminvolvementinpost-conflictreconstruction,reflectsboththeinternalnatureoftheEUandthebroaderinternationaltrendsatthetime.TheEU’sinternalhistoricalexperienceofsecuringpeacethroughintegrationhasbeenreflectedintheemphasisputontheinstitution-buildingandintegrationoftheWesternBalkancountriesintotheUnion.Externally,theendofColdWarconfrontationsreducedtherelevanceofmilitarypower,inspiteoftheYugoslavwarshappeningrightnextdoorandunderscoringtheEU’sinabilitytopreventthefightingortointervene.AlthoughwarwasstillarealityinonecornerofEurope,inalonger-termperspectivethefutureofEuropeansecuritydependedtoalargeextentonthesuccessofpoliticalandeconomictransformationinpost-Communistcountriesandbeyond,whichhighlightedtheneedforabroadersetoftools.Internally,theEUbuiltitsforeignpolicyidentitystronglyonthenotionsofcivilianandnormativepower(thelatternotexcludingtheuseofmilitaryinstruments,butnonethelessstressinganon-militaryapproach).Inanattempttoturnthelackofmilitarycapabilitiesintoavirtue–orreflectingaconvictionthatacivilianapproachwasindeedtheEU’sparticularstrengthandadvantage–theEU(andahostofEUFSPresearch)emphasisedtheuniquenatureofitsinternationalactorness.9

Sincethemid-2000s,theEuropeanandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthasbecomemoreconflictual,complexandunpredictable.ThisisevidentinthecontrastbetweentheEuropeanSecurityStrategyof2003andtheEUGlobalStrategyof

9E.g.,Fran?oisDuchêne,“TheEuropeanCommunityandtheUncertaintiesofInterdependence”,inMaxKohnstammandWolfgangHager(eds),ANationWritLarge?Foreign-PolicyProblemsbeforetheEuropeanCommunity,London/Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,1973,p.1-21;IanManners,“NormativePowerEurope:AContradictioninTerms?”,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.40,No.2(June2002),p.235-258.

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2016.WhiletheprioritiesofEUFSPremainedlargelythesame,thelatterpointstoahostofnewchallenges,highlightingtheneedto“enhanceoureffortsondefence,cyber,counterterrorism,energyandstrategiccommunications”.10Thestrategyalsocallsforstrongerintelligencecapabilitiestoachieve“betterandsharedassessmentsofinternalandexternalthreatsandchallenges”.11Theseinstrumentsarepartofan“integratedapproach”toconflictsandcrises–aconceptintroducedbytheGlobalStrategy,buildingonearliereffortstodevelopa“comprehensiveapproach”.12TheneedtostrengthentheharderendofEUFSPinstrumentshasbeendictatedbyexternalfactors,whiletheEU’sreadinesstomoveaheadhasbeenweakenedbyinternalpoliticalfactorssuchaslackofacommonstrategiccultureandsharedthreatperceptions.Arguablytoday,whiletheregionalandglobalsecurityenvironmentmakesstrengtheningEUFSPmorenecessarythanever,strongerinternalcohesionismoredifficulttoachieve.

1.2AssessingtheevolutionofEUdiplomacyandcrisismanagement

Asnotedabove,theEU’sdiplomatictoolsmadealeapforwardwiththeMaastrichtTreatythatestablishedtheCFSP.ThecreationoftheinstitutionsoftheHighRepresentative(HR)forCFSP(1999),apostlatermergedwiththatoftheExternalActionCommissionerintoanempoweredHighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyandVice-PresidentoftheCommission(HRVP)(2009),andtheEEAS(alsoin2009)strengthenedtheEU’sdiplomaticcapacity.YettheUnion’sachievementsinmanagingconflictsandcriseshavebeenmodest.Weakpoliticalunity,institutionalcohesionandpolicyinstruments,includinghardpowertobackupsofttools,arefrequentlycitedreasonsforthelimitedsuccess.Abrieflookatfourdifferentcases–thewarsinex-Yugoslaviainthe1990s,inGeorgiain2008andinLibyain2011,andthetalksoverIran’snuclearprogramme–illustratesthelimitsofEUdiplomacy.

10EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy,June2016,p.9,

https://europa.

eu/!Tr66qx

.

11Ibid.,p.45.

12EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentativeoftheUnion,TheEU’sComprehensiveApproachtoExternalConflictandCrises(JOIN/2013/30),11December2013,

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/

legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52013JC0030.

Forabriefanalysisandcomparisonoftheconcepts,seeThierryTardy,“TheEU:FromComprehensiveVisionToIntegratedAction”,inEUISSBriefs,No.5(February2017),

https://www.iss.europa.eu/node/1297

.

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ThenewlycreatedCFSPexperienceda“baptismoffire”inthe1990sconflictsrelatedtothebreakupofYugoslavia.13DiplomacywastheEU’smaintooltoaddresstheconflicts,complementedbyeconomicbenefits,sanctionsandhumanitarianaid.TheUnitedStatesinitiallychosetostayinthebackground,pushingtheEUtolead,forthefirsttimeever,mediationbetweenwarringpartiesinthebloodiestconflictinEuropesinceWWII.TheEU’sfailuresledtotheUnitedStates(andNATO)takingactiontoendthewar.ManyobserverswerehighlycriticaloftheEU’scontribution,14althoughitsimpactandgrowthinmaturityduringtheprocesswasalsoacknowledged.15OneoftheconclusionsdrawnwasthattheEUneededtoimprovethefunctioningofitsCFSPandcreateanoperationaldefencecapability,tobebetterpreparedtodealwithotherconflictsinitsneighbourhood.16

Thesix-daywarinGeorgiainAugust2008wasanotheroccasionwheretheUnitedStatespushedEuropeanstotaketheinitiative.France,whoheldthepresidencyoftheCouncilatthetime,tooktheleadinbrokeringaceasefirebetweenTbilisiandMoscowonbehalfoftheEU.ItachievedthegoalofendingthewarandstoppingRussiafromenteringdeeperintoGeorgia’sterritory.However,sincethentheEUhasfailedtopushbackRussia’smilitarypresenceinAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaandensurerespectforGeorgia’sterritorialintegrity,whichithighlightsinprinciple.TheEUdeclinedtouseotherinstruments,suchassanctions,topushRussiatofullyimplementtheceasefireagreementandwithdrawitsmilitarytothelinewhereithadbeenbeforethewar.17Instead,itquicklyrestorednormaldiplomatictiesandcooperationwithRussia.Arguably,theRussiansidetookthisasasignalthatitcouldgetawaywithmilitaryaggressionanduseforcetoregaininfluenceinthepost-Sovietspace.Therefore,theEU’spartialdiplomaticsuccesscanbecharacterisedasafailureofmulti-sectorness.

13RoyH.Ginsberg,TheEuropeanUnioninInternationalPolitics.BaptismbyFire,Lanham,RowmanandLittlefield,2001.

14E.g.RichardHolbrooke,ToEndaWar,NewYork,RandomHouse,1998;PhilipH.Gordon,“Europe’sUncommonForeignPolicy”,inInternationalSecurity,Vol.22,No.3(Winter1997/1998),p.74-100.

15RoyH.Ginsberg,TheEuropeanUnioninInternationalPolitics,cit.;JohnPeterson,“USandEUintheBalkans:‘AmericaFightstheWars,EuropeDoestheDishes’?”,inEUIWorkingPapersRSC,No.2001/49(2001),

/1814/1758

.

16RoyH.Ginsberg,TheEuropeanUnioninInternationalPolitics,cit.

17RonaldD.Asmus,ALittleWarthatShooktheWorld.Georgia,Russia,andtheFutureoftheWest,NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2010,p.189-214.

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TheEUwasagainexpectedbytheUnitedStatestotaketheleadinrespondingtothecivilwarinLibyain2011,givenhowstronglyFranceandtheUnitedKingdompushedforamilitaryintervention.However,theEUfailedtotakeupaprominentroleapartfromprovidinghumanitarianaid,whiletheinternationalresponsebecamefocusedonmilitaryintervention.Inarareshowofdiplomaticdisunity,EUcountriesfailedtoreachacommonpositionintheUnitedNationsSecurityConflict(UNSC),withGermany,anelectedUNSCmemberatthetime,abstaininginavoteontheauthorisationofamilitaryintervention,alongwithBrazil,China,IndiaandRussia.FranceandtheUnitedKingdomtooktheleadinimposingano-flyzone,authorisedbyUNSCResolution1973andrelyingonaNATOframeworktoenforce.USmilitaryinvolvementturnedouttobecritical,exposingtheweaknessofEuropeanforces.TheconflicthighlightedthelackofacommonstrategiccultureofEUmemberstates.

TheEU’sdiplomaticengagementemergedasamoreappropriateinstrumentinaddressingIran’snuclearprogramme.In2003–5,theE3andtheHR(E3/EU)triedtoobtainfromtheIraniansobjectiveguaranteesthattheirnuclearprogrammeonlyhadpeacefulaims.Whenthetalksfailedinearly2006,theEUHRplayedaleadingroleinarenewedandexpandeddiplomaticprocessthateventuallyledtotheconclusionoftheJointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA)in2015.Theagreementinvolvingthe“E3/EU+3”–China,France,Germany,Russia,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates–andIranwascelebratedasamajorachievementofEUdiplomacy.TheJCPOAseekstoensureIran’snuclearprogrammewillbeexclusivelypeaceful.ImplementationoftheprogrammewastheconditionfortheEUtoliftitsnuclear-relatedeconomicandfinancialsanctionsagainstIran,whichitdidin2016.However,theunilateralwithdrawaloftheUnitedStatesfromtheJCPOAin2018dealtanalmostfatalblowtotheprogramme,yetagainhighlightingtheEU’slackofcapacityforautonomousaction.18

TocomplementtheevolutionofEUdiplomacy,CSDPwaslaunchedin1999withtheprimarytaskofplanningandconductingcrisismanagementoperations.19Since

18RiccardoAlcaro,“Europe’sDefenceoftheIranNuclearDeal:LessthanaSuccess,MorethanaFailure”,inTheInternationalSpectator,Vol.56,No.1(March2021),p.55-72,

/10.1080/03

932729.2021.1876861

;RiccardoAlcaro,EuropeandIran’sNuclearCrisis.LeadGroupsandEUForeignPolicy-Making,Basingstoke/NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2018.

19GiovanniGrevi,“ESDPinstitutions”,inGiovanniGrevi,DamienHellyandDanielKeohane(eds),

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thentheEUhaslaunched35missionsandoperations,coveringawidespectrumofcivilianandmilitarytasksandallstagesofconflictfrompreventiontointerventionandpeacebuilding.Thefirstoperationswereintroducedinthefavourablepoliticalandsecurityenvironmentoftheearly2000s,whentheEU’sownsecuritywasassessedtobestrongerthanever,theUnionwaswideninganddeepening,anddomesticandexternalexpectationsfortheEUtobecomeastrongerinternationalactorwerehigh.20Insubsequentyears,CSDPmissionsandoperationsbecameanimportantpartoftheEU’sresponsetoconflictsintheneighbourhoodandbeyond,includingtheWesternBalkans,Georgia,Ukraine,Libya,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)andSomalia.

TheCSDPmissionsandoperationshavehadmixedresults.21Theyhavehadsomesuccessinreachingthemandatedgoals,butthesehaveoftenbeenratherlimited,reflectingtheEU’slowlevelofambitionasacrisismanager.TheEUhasgenerallynotbeengoodatconflictpreventionandrapidresponse,whichwouldusuallybethemostcost-effectiveapproach.Sometimesithasfailedtoestablishamissioninsituationswheretherewasanobviousneedandahighexpectationforittodoso,mostnotablyinLibyain2011,characterisedasthe“archetypicalscenarioforwhichtheCSDPhadbeenpreparingtoassumeleadership”.22Politicaldisagreementsandlimitedreadinessofmemberstatestocontributeintelligenceandothercapabilitieshavebeenmajorobstacles.Institutionalcoherencehasalsobeenachallenge,althoughtheinstitutionalset-uphasgraduallyimproved.Overtime,CSDPmissionshavebecomemoreembeddedintheEU’sbroaderforeignpolicygoals.23

TheEUhashighlightedtheneedforacomprehensive,ormorerecently“integrated”,approachbringingtogethercivilianandmilitaryassets.Yettherelationshipand

EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy:TheFirstTenYears(1999-2009),Paris,EUISS,2009,p.19,

https://www.iss.europa.eu/node/611

.

20ChristophO.Meyer,“CSDPMissionsandOperations”,inEuropeanParliamentIn-DepthAnalysis,

January2020,p.4,

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_

IDA(2020)603481

.

21Ibid.

22JolyonHoworth,“TheLisbonTreaty,CSDPandtheEUasaSecurityActor”,inMarioTelòandFrederikPonjaert(eds),TheEU’sForeignPolicy.WhatKindofPowerandDiplomaticAction?,