




版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請進行舉報或認領(lǐng)
文檔簡介
1、SOLUTIONSTOTEXTPROBLEMS:QuickQuizzes1. Amarketmighthaveamonopolybecause:akeyresourceisownedbyasinglefirm;(2)thegovernmentgivesasinglefirmtheexclusiverighttoproducesomegood;and(3)thecostsofproductionmakeasingleproducermoreefficientthanalargenumberofproducers.Examplesofmonopoliesinclude:thewaterproduc
2、erinasmalltown,whichownsakeyresource,theonewellintown;(2)pharmaceuticalcompanieswhoaregivenapatentonanewdrugbythegovernment;and(3)abridge,whichisanaturalmonopolybecause(ifthebridgeisuncongested)havingjustonebridgeisefficient.Manyotherexamplesarepossible.2. Amonopolistchoosestheamountofoutputtoproduc
3、ebyfindingthequantityatwhichmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost.Itfindsthepricetochargebyfindingthepointonthedemandcurveatthatquantity.3. Amonopolistproducesaquantityofoutputthatslessthanthequantityofoutputthatmaximizestotalsurplusbecauseitproducesthequantityatwhichmarginalcostequalsmarginalrevenuerat
4、herthanthequantityatwhichmarginalcostequalsprice.4. Policymakerscanrespondtotheinefficienciescausedbymonopoliesinoneoffourways:bytryingtomakemonopolizedindustriesmorecompetitive;(2)byregulatingthebehaviorofthemonopolies;(3)byturningsomeprivatemonopoliesintopublicenterprises;and(4)bydoingnothingatall
5、.Antitrustlawsprohibitmergersoflargecompaniesandpreventthemfromcoordinatingtheiractivitiesinwaysthatmakemarketslesscompetitive,butsuchlawsmaykeepcompaniesfrommergingtogainfromsynergies.Somemonopolies,especiallynaturalmonopolies,areregulatedbythegovernment,butitishardtokeepamonopolyinbusiness,achieve
6、marginal-costpricing,andgivethemonopolistincentivetoreducecosts.Privatemonopoliescanbetakenoverbythegovernment,butthecompaniesarenotlikelytobewellrun.Sometimesdoingnothingatallmayseemtobethebestsolution,butthereareclearlydeadweightlossesfrommonopolythatsocietywillhavetobear.5. Examplesofpricediscrim
7、inationinclude:(1)movietickets,forwhichchildrenandseniorcitizensgetlowerprices;(2)airlineprices,whicharedifferentforbusinessandleisuretravelers;(3)discountcoupons,whichleadtodifferentpricesforpeoplewhovaluetheirtimeindifferentways;(4) financialaid,whichofferscollegetuitionatlowerpricestopoorstudents
8、andhigherpricestowealthystudents;and(5)quantitydiscounts,whichofferlowerpricesforhigherquantities,capturingmoreofabuyerswillingnesstoMpay.otherexamplesarepossible.Perfectpricediscriminationreducesconsumersurplus,increasesproducersurplusbythesameamount,andhasnoeffectontotalsurplus,comparedtoacompetit
9、ivemarket.Comparedtoamonopolythatchargesasingleprice,perfectpricediscriminationreducesconsumersurplus,increasesproducersurplus,andincreasestotalsurplus,sincethereisnodeadweightloss.QuestionsforReview1. Anexampleofagovernment-createdmonopolycomesfromtheexistenceofpatentandcopyrightlaws.Bothallowfirms
10、orindividualstobemonopoliesforextendedperiodsoftime20yearsforpatents,foreverforcopyrights.Butthismonopolypowerisgood,becausewithoutit,noonewouldwriteabook(becauseanyonecouldprintcopiesofit,sotheauthorwouldgetnoincome)andnofirmwouldinvestinresearchanddevelopmenttoinventnewproductsordrugs(sinceanyothe
11、rcompanycouldproduceorsellthem,andthefirmwouldgetnoprofitfromitsinvestment).2. Anindustryisanaturalmonopolywhenasinglefirmcansupplyagoodorservicetoanentiremarketatasmallercostthancouldtwoormorefirms.Asamarketgrowsitmayevolvefromanaturalmonopolytoacompetitivemarket.3. Amonopolistsmarginalrevenueisles
12、sthanthepriceofitsproductbecause:(1)itsdemandcurveisthemarketdemandcurve,so(2)toincreasetheamountsold,themonopolistmustlowerthepriceofitsgoodforeveryunititsells.(3)Thiscutinpricesreducesrevenueontheunitsitwasalreadyselling.Amonopolistsmarginalrevenuecanbenegativebecausetogetpurchaserstobuyanaddition
13、alunitofthegood,thefirmmustreduceitspriceonallunitsofthegood.Thefactthatitsellsagreaterquantityincreasesrevenue,butthedeclineinpricedecreasesrevenue.Theoveralleffectdependsontheelasticityofthedemandcurve.Ifthedemandcurveisinelastic,marginalrevenuewillbenegative.4. Figure1showsthedemand,marginal-reve
14、nue,andmarginal-costcurvesforamonopolist.Theintersectionofthemarginal-revenueandmarginal-costcurvesdeterminestheprofit-maximizinglevelofoutput,Qm.Thedemandcurvethenshowstheprofit-maximizingprice,Pm.5. ThelevelofoutputthatmaximizestotalsurplusinFigure1iswherethedemandcurveintersectsthemarginal-costcu
15、rve,Qc.ThedeadweightlossfrommonopolyisthetriangularareabetweenQcandQmthatisabovethemarginal-costcurveandbelowthedemandcurve.Itrepresentsdeadweightloss,sincesocietylosestotalsurplusbecauseofmonopoly,equaltothevalueofthegood(measuredbytheheightofthedemandcurve)lessthecostofproduction(givenbytheheighto
16、fthemarginal-costcurve),forthequantitiesbetweenQmandQc.6. Thegovernmenthasthepowertoregulatemergersbetweenfirmsbecauseofantitrustlaws.Firmsmightwanttomergetoincreaseoperatingefficiencyandreducecosts,somethingthatisgoodforsociety,ortogainmonopolypower,whichisbadforsociety.7. Whenregulatorstellanatura
17、lmonopolythatitmustsetpriceequaltomarginalcost,twoproblemsarise.Thefirstisthat,becauseanaturalmonopolyhasaconstantmarginalcostthatislessthanaveragecost,settingpriceequaltomarginalcostmeansthatthepriceislessthanaveragecost,sothefirmwilllosemoney.Thefirmwouldthenexittheindustryunlessthegovernmentsubsi
18、dizedit.However,gettingrevenueforsuchasubsidywouldcausethegovernmenttoraiseothertaxes,increasingthedeadweightloss.Thesecondproblemofusingcoststosetpriceisthatitgivesthemonopolynoincentivetoreducecosts.8. Oneexampleofpricediscriminationisinpublishingbooks.Publisherschargeamuchhigherpriceforhardbackbo
19、oksthanforpaperbackbooksfarhigherthanthedifferenceinproductioncosts.Publishersdothisbecausedie-hardfanswillpaymoreforahardbackbookwhenthebookisfirstreleased.Thosewhodontvaluethebookashighlywillwaitforthepaperbackversiontocomeout.Thepublishermakesgreaterprofitthiswaythanifitchargedjustoneprice.Asecon
20、dexampleisthepricingofmovietickets.Theatersgivediscountstochildrenandseniorcitizensbecausetheyhavealowerwillingnesstopayforaticket.Chargingdifferentpriceshelpsthetheaterincreaseitsprofitabovewhatitwouldbeifitchargedjustoneprice.ProblemsandApplications1. Thefollowingtableshowsrevenue,costs,andprofits
21、,wherequantitiesareinthousands,andtotalrevenue,totalcost,andprofitareinmillionsofdollars:PriceQuantity(1,000s)TotalRevenueMarginalRevenueTotalCostProfit$1000$0$2$-2901009$93680200167412703002155166040024361850500251718406002439122080016-5106109009-711-201,0000-912-12a. Aprofit-maximizin
22、gpublisherwouldchooseaquantityof400,000atapriceof$60oraquantityof500,000atapriceof$50;bothcombinationswouldleadtoprofitsof$18million.b. Marginalrevenueisalwayslessthanprice.Pricefallswhenquantityrisesbecausethedemandcurveslopesdownward,butmarginalrevenuefallsevenmorethanpricebecausethefirmlosesreven
23、ueonalltheunitsofthegoodsoldwhenitlowerstheprice.c. Figure2showsthemarginal-revenue,marginal-cost,anddemandcurves.Themarginal-revenueandmarginal-costcurvescrossbetweenquantitiesof400,000and500,000.Thissignifiesthatthefirmmaximizesprofitsinthatregion.4C0 5001.000QuantityFigure2d. Theareaofdeadweightl
24、ossismarkedDWLDeaewgigretlossmeansthatthetotalsurplusintheeconomyislessthanitwouldbeifthemarketwerecompetitive,sincethemonopolistproduceslessthanthesociallyefficientlevelofoutput.e. Iftheauthorwerepaid$3millioninsteadof$2million,thepublisherwouldnprice,sincetherewouldbenochangeinmarginalcostormargin
25、alrevenue.Theonlythingthatwouldbeaffectedwouldbethefirmsprofit,whichwouldfall.f. Tomaximizeeconomicefficiency,thepublisherwouldsetthepriceat$10perbook,sincethatsthemarginalcostofthebook.Atthatprice,thepublisherwouldhavenegativeprofitsequaltotheamountpaidtotheauthor.Figure 3(DnLISASH。5 0U6。一dQuantity
26、2. Figure3川ustratesanaturalmonopolistsettingprice,Patc,equaltoaveragetotalcost.TheequilibriumquantityisQatc.MarginalcostpricingwouldyieldthepricePmcandquantityQmc.ForquantitiesbetweenQatcandQmc,thebenefittoconsumers(measuredbythedemandcurve)exceedsthecostofproduction(measuredbythemarginalcostcurve).
27、Thismeansthatthedeadweightlossfromsettingpriceequaltoaveragetotalcostisthetriangularareashowninthefigure.3. Maildeliveryhasanalways-decliningaverage-total-costcurve,sincetherearelargefixedcostsforequipment.Themarginalcostofdeliveringaletterisverysmall.However,thecostsarehigherinisolatedruralareastha
28、ntheyareindenselypopulatedurbanareas,sincetransportationcostsdiffer.Overtime,increasedautomationhasreducedmarginalcostandincreasedfixedcosts,sotheaverage-total-costcurvehasbecomesteeperatsmallquantitiesandflatterathighquantities.4. Ifthepriceoftapwaterrises,thedemandforbottledwaterincreases.ThisisshowninFigure4asashifttotherightinthedemandcurvefromDitoD2.Thecorrespondingmarginal-revenuecurvesareMR1andMR2.Theprofit-maximizinglevelofoutputiswheremarginalcostequalsmarginalrevenue.Priortotheincreaseinthepriceoftapwater,theprofit-maximizinglevelofoutputisQi;afterthepriceincrease,itrisest
溫馨提示
- 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
- 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
- 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁內(nèi)容里面會有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
- 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文庫網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲空間,僅對用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護處理,對用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對任何下載內(nèi)容負責(zé)。
- 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當內(nèi)容,請與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
- 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。
最新文檔
- 2025年綠色智能物流倉儲中心建設(shè)項目合作協(xié)議
- 2025年公共文化設(shè)施運營合同管理及社會效益評估準則
- 2025年企業(yè)核心競爭力人才招聘及綜合福利保障合同
- 2025年智能班輪運輸貨物包裝解決方案定制合同
- 2025年智能互動幼兒園環(huán)境創(chuàng)設(shè)與保育服務(wù)聘用合同
- 2025年印刷行業(yè)數(shù)字化印刷設(shè)備引進與操作員培訓(xùn)服務(wù)合同
- 2025年房地產(chǎn)按揭貸款第三方擔(dān)保協(xié)議模板
- 2025綜合養(yǎng)老院入住生活照料與心靈呵護服務(wù)合同
- 2025年IDC數(shù)據(jù)中心網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全防護與應(yīng)急響應(yīng)服務(wù)合同
- 2025年度航空航天復(fù)合材料供應(yīng)合同范本
- XX學(xué)校(幼兒園)食堂管理各崗位廉政(廉潔)風(fēng)險點及防控措施一覽表
- 鋼結(jié)構(gòu)鋼爬梯包工包料合同范本
- 家庭房屋財產(chǎn)協(xié)議書
- 陶行知生活即教育教師讀書分享
- 工業(yè)固廢處置協(xié)議書
- 股東決策協(xié)議書模板
- NB/T 11525-2024氣動、電動調(diào)度單軌吊車技術(shù)條件
- 2025年全國特種設(shè)備觀光車N1證理論考試筆試試題(含答案)
- 1.1什么是新媒體 課件(共17張)-《新媒體營銷》同步教學(xué)(北京出版社)
- 林地托管合同協(xié)議
- 2020-2025年中國智慧倉儲行業(yè)市場調(diào)查研究及投資戰(zhàn)略咨詢報告
評論
0/150
提交評論