BolsteringenergysecurityinNortheasternEuropethroughtransatlanticcooperationNortheasternEuropehasalreadymadeeffortstoenditsrelianceonRussianenergysupplies,throughinvestmentingasinfrastructureandcleanenergytechnology.ThispivotnotonlyinsulatestheregionfromRussianenergyleveragebutprimesitstransformationintoanenergyhubforallofEurope.Ongoing

diversificationinNortheasternEuropewouldensureregionalenergysecurityandcontribute

totheclimateandsecurityobjectivesoftheentirecontinent.TheUnitedStatescanplayameaningfulroleinthisendeavor.Transatlanticcoordinationcouldbolstertheliquefiednaturalgastrade,driveinvestmentintocriticalinfrastructure,bringcleantechnologiestomarketquicker,andfostercompletionoftheBalticstates’desynchronizationfromtheRussianpowergrid.Doingsowouldcreateabulwarkoflow-carbonenergysecurityonRussia’sborder,

impedingitscampaigntowieldenergyasaweaponwhileadvancingtheobjectivesoftheEuropeanGreenDeal.NortheasternEuropeistheperfectregionfortheUnitedStatesanditsalliestoprovethatde-Russificationanddecarbonizationoftheenergysectorcanoccurintandem.I.IntroductionMoscow’swarinUkraineispushingEuropeanenergysystemstowardafuturewithoutRussianenergyimports.TheKremliniswieldingnaturalgasshut-offsandcurtailmenttoexertpressureonEuropeancountries,intertwiningRussia’senergyexportswithitsmilitarypriorities.Europe’scontinuedpurchasesofRussiangascontributetoarecordwindfallof$20billionpermonththatfundsRussia’swar.1

DrasticallyreducingtheseprofitsthroughEuropeanenergydiversificationisoneofthemosteffectivewaystodepriveRussiaofrevenueforthewaranditsothermalignactivities.NortheasternEurope—theBalticStatesandtheirimmediateneighborsFinlandandPoland—hasalreadytakenimportantstepstowardbreakingitsrelianceonRussianenergythroughinvestmentsinnaturalgasinfrastructureandcleanenergytechnologies.EvenpriortothewarinUkraine,NortheasternEuropeanticipatedtheriskofoverrelianceonRussianenergy,andadvancedtowardbroaderEuropeanintegrationofelectricityandgasmarkets,enablingitstransformationfromanenergyislandtoanemergingenergyhub.AsEuropeweighssanctionsandpricecapsonRussiangasandpreparesforawinterwithoutRussianenergyimports,NortheasternEuropemustaccelerateitseffortstodisentangleitsenergysystemsfromRussia’sthroughenergydiversificationanddesynchronizationfromRussia’spowergrid.Newimportedenergysourcesandlocalizedlow-carbongenerationwillstrengthenregionalsecurity,enhanceNortheasternEurope’sroleintheEuropeanenergysystem,anddiminishRussia’sabilitytofinanceitswarsandtoextortpoliticalobediencefromEuropeancapitals.TheUnitedStatescanplayameaningfulroleinbolsteringNortheasternEurope’ssecurityandclimateobjectives.Transatlanticcoordinationoncriticalinfrastructuredevelopment,increasedliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)trade,andtechnicalexpertisewouldexpeditediversification,cleanenergydeployment,andthecommercializationofnewenergytechnologiesinNortheasternEurope.Furthermore,UScollaborationcanhelptheregiontomitigateMoscow’shybridthreatarsenal,includinggridcyberdefense,energy-relateddisinformation,andtheproximityofRussian-madenuclearreactorstotheregion.BypursuingtheseprioritieswiththeUnitedStates’support,NortheasternEuropecandelinkfromRussia’spowersystemtobecomeaprominentexporterofcleanenergy,enablingresilienceacrossCentralandEasternEurope(CEE).Moreover,expandedLNGcapacityintheregioncanprovideanalternativesupplyintotheEuropeanUnion(EU)gasnetworktoaddressnear-termgaschallenges,anoutcomethatisinthebestinterestnotonlyofEurope,butalsooftheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateshasaclearinterestinadvancingtheseefforts;astrong,energy-secureEuropeisatopgeostrategicpriorityforthetransatlanticallianceasitcontendswithresurgentauthoritarianism.NortheasternEuropeisonthefrontlinesofRussianattemptstoreclaimasphereofinfluenceandrelitigatethepost-ColdWarsettlement,asevidencedbythelatestassaultagainstUkraine.TheoverwhelmingsupportinWashingtonfortheregion’senergysecurityisatestamenttothenonpartisannatureofthisissue.NortheasternEurope,theEuropeanUnion,andtheUnitedStatesmustworktogethertocapitalizeonthishistoricmomenttoaccelerateenergysecurityeffortstobolsterNATO’seasternflank,whilepursuingclimateobjectivestodeliverontheParisAgreement.Transatlanticpartnershipongas,cleantech,andintegrationoftheBalticgridintotheEuropeansystemwillbecriticaltosynergize

energydiversification

anddecarbonizationoftheNortheasternEuropeanenergysystemtoadvancesecurityandclimateobjectivesintandem.IIRegionalenergydiversificationanddecarbonizationNortheasternEuropeanenergyrequiresdiversificationofbothnaturalgasimportsourcesandtheregion’soverallenergymix,twoprocessesthatarecomplementary.WhileregionalandbroaderEUeffortshavemadesubstantialprogressonbothofthesefronts,USsupportwillbecriticaltoacceleratingsupplydiversificationanddecarbonizationinaccordancewiththeurgencycreatedbythewarinUkraine.2.1DiversifyingnaturalgassupplyintheregionDiversifyingNortheasternEurope’snaturalgassupplyisoneprongofthestrategycriticaltomeetingshort-andmedium-termgasdemand,whiledecarbonizationwillreduceoverallgasdemandinthemedium-to-longterm.DespitesignificantrelianceonRussiafornaturalgasamongNortheasternEuropeancountries,theregionhasseensubstantialprogresstowarddiversifyingitsnaturalgasimportcapacity,offeringvaluablelessonsthatcouldhelpEuropeasawholetransitionawayfromRussianenergysources.Lithuaniaservesasaregionalmodelfordiversifyingnaturalgassupply.Asrecentlyas2014,theBalticstateimported100percentofitsgasfromRussia.2

Thatsameyear,however,markedtheinaugurationofafloatingstorageandregasificationunit(FSRU)forLNGatKlaip?da,aLithuanianportcity.TheKlaip?daterminalstrengthenedLithuania’sbargainingpowerwithGazprom,whichwascompelledtoofferLithuaniaa20percentdiscountonsales,loweringgaspricestolevelsclosertothecontinentalEuropeanaverage.3

In2020,Lithuaniareceivedonly52percentofitsgasfromRussia,anditceasedRussiangasimportsinApril2022.4

ThewarinUkrainehasofferedvindicationofLithuania’sLNGstrategy,givingthenationalparliamenttheleewaytolegallybarallRussianimportsinJune2022.5Caption:Afloatingstorageandregasificationunit(FSRU)forliquefiednaturalgasatKlaip?daenabledLithuaniatoweanitselfoffRussiangas.

Credit:REUTERS/IntsKalnins

Klaip?da’ssuccessdemonstratesthelong-termnatureofthethreatposedbyRussianenergyleverageandtheneedtoinvestinlong-termsolutions,alessonrelevanttobothLNGandgasinterconnectionprojects,andtoevenlonger-termlow-carbonenergydeployment,whichwillbediscussedinlatersections.Klaip?daalsoservesasawarningthatnewinvestmentsmustbeaccompaniedbyclear,coordinatedmessagingthatcanwithstandKremlin-directeddisinformation.6

Thisisparticularlysalienttoday,astheregion,theEuropeanUnion,andtheUnitedStatescollaboratetocombineclimatewithenergysecurityobjectives,whicharetoooftenportrayedasincompatible,particularlybypopulistmovementslinkedtoRussia’scross-borderpolitical-influencecampaigns.Soundfinancing,energydiplomacy,andpoliticalmessagingstrategieswillbecriticalforNortheasternEurope’sgassecurityforyearstocome.AsEurope’ssupplychallengesgrowwithwinteronthehorizon,thesuccessofKlaip?daisbeingemulatedwiththeutmosturgency.Klaip?daitselfhasseenutilizationnearlytriplebetween2018andthefirsthalfof2022,withmostimportstransferredbeyondLithuania’sborders,leadingthewayfortheregion’sgas-supplydiversificationinthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.7

AdditionalLNGinfrastructureisnowproliferatingacrossNortheasternEurope.LatviaisplanningaterminalatSkulte,PolandisbuildingitssecondatGdańsk,andFinlandandEstoniahavejointlyleasedanFSRUfromUSfirmExcelerateEnergy.8IncreasedLNGimportsnecessitategreaterinterconnection,withPolandemergingasanimportantregionalgasnode.Thesoon-to-beoperationalizedBalticPipewillbring10billioncubicmetersperyear(bcma)ofNorwegiangastoPoland.Theconstructionofadditionalinterconnectingpipelineshasalsobeenprioritized.TheEuropeanCommissionhasprovidedthree-quartersofthefundingformemberstates’projects,including:(1)the2.6-bcmaBalticconectorbetweenFinlandandEstonia;(2)theGasInterconnectorPoland-Lithuania(GIPL),abi-directional,2-bcmaconnectioncreatedtosupportutilizationofKlaip?daandPoland’s?winouj?cieterminal;and(3)theNorth-SouthGasCorridor,abi-directionalconnectionthatallowsPolandtoimport5.7bcmafromSoutheasternEurope.9

Thelattertwoprojectshavebeenrecentlycompleted.AllthreearecrucialfortheregiontoimportanadequateandmoveablegassupplyfromproducersotherthanRussia.Asmoreimportandtransportcapacitycomesonline,ensuringmaximumutilization—whichincludestheabilitytostoregassuppliesanddeploythemacrossEurope—willbeofutmostimportance.10

TheEuropeanUnionhasalreadyexceededits2022requirementsthatavailablestoragebefilledtoatleast80percentcapacity.Thetargetincreasesto90percentin2023andsubsequentyears.Increasedinterconnectionwillcreateliquidityforthecombined5.9-bcmexistinggasstoragecapacityinPolandandLatvia.11

AmoreextensivepipelinenetworkcouldalsoconnecttonaturalgeologicformationsinLatviaandaddaprospectivestoragecapacityof50bcma,whichwoulddoubletheEuropeanUnion’sstoragecapacity.12AnothercriticaltoolforEuropeangassupplysecurityisthecoordinationofdemandaggregationacrossEuropeforsecuringsufficientsupplyatlowerprices,especiallyfornationswithannualnaturalgasdemandbelow5bcm.Thecurrentsellers’marketmakesitchallengingforthesecountriestocompeteforandnegotiatefavorablelong-termcontracts;combinedvolumesaremorelikelytoattractsuppliers,andcoordinatedpurchasingpowerwillleadtogreaterleverageinnegotiations.TheEuropeanUnionhasalreadyrecognizedtheneedforsucheffortsthroughitsnewEUEnergyPlatform,whichaimstocoordinatejointpurchasesofnaturalgasandhydrogenasabloc.13

Thenaturalgasindustry,theUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,andnationalleadersmustworktogethertoimplementthismechanismforpoolingpurchasingpower.Inadditiontohelpingfacilitatethesematches,governmentscanalsoplayacriticalroleinmanagingrisksforbuyerswithconcernsabouttwenty-yearcommitments—theaveragelengthoflong-termcontractstoday.Asbuyersseekguaranteedcarbonemissionsreductionsforthesupplies,andoptionstodivertsuppliesinthelongterm,theindustryhasofferedcreativesolutionswithinthecontractstomeetthesedemands.Incaseswheresufficientflexibilitycannotbeguaranteed,however,governmentshaveanopportunitytotakeonsomeoftheserisks.2.2TheUSroleindiversifyingnaturalgassuppliesNortheasternEuropehasadvancedtowarditsgasdiversificationandreliabilitygoals,butRussia’swardemandsthatprogressacceleraterapidly,providingtheUnitedStatesacrucialandimmediateroletoplay.WashingtonshouldenhanceongoingregionalandEuropeaneffortsbyincreasingnaturalgasexports,coordinatingoutreachwithotheralternativegassuppliers,andleveragingfinanceandprivatesectorpartnershipstodeploynewinfrastructureforreceivingalternativegassupplyinNortheasternEurope.AmidahighlycompetitiveglobalmarketplaceforLNG,theUnitedStatesisapivotalplayerastheworld’stopexporter.14

InMarch,theJoeBidenadministrationpromisedthatatleast15bcmofUSLNGwouldreachtheEuropeanUnionthisyear,andevenmorewouldbepledgedinthefollowingyears.15

TheUnitedStatesmustfurtherexportsbyboostingitsliquefactioncapacity—includingontheEastCoastnearitshighlyproductiveAppalachianfields—tohelpdisplacethe155bcmthatRussiasuppliestoEurope.Moreover,safelyresumingTexas’sFreeportLNGoperationsatfullcapacity,whichwereshutdownduetoanexplosionlastJune,couldrestore17percentofUSLNGexportcapacity.16TheUnitedStatesnowsuppliesmoregastoEuropethanRussia,butUSLNGalonecannotcompensatefordecreasedRussiansupply.Toincreaseglobalsupply,WashingtonshouldcontinuetoengageothertopLNGexporters,suchasQatarandAustralia,asithasattemptedthroughdiplomacywithmajoroilproducers.17

Outreachtoothermajorimportersisalsocritical.TheUnitedStatesrecentlypersuadedJapan—theworld’snumber-twoLNGimporterafterChina—todivertsomeofitslong-termcontractstosupplyEurope.18

FindingwaystoensurefungibilityindestinationforLNGcargoesandmanagingcompetitioninatightmarketplaceiscrucialtoglobalenergysecurity.WashingtonandpartnercapitalshavemanybilateralandmultilateralmechanismstoadvancetheinfrastructurenecessarytoallowNortheasternEuropeantodiversifyitsgassupply.ElevatingtheprofileoftheNATOEnergySecurityCenterofExcellenceinVilniuscancontributetomultilateralcoordinationandthedisseminationofbestpracticesacrosstheregion.Otherexistingpartnerships,suchastheThreeSeasInitiativeandthePartnershipforTransatlanticEnergyandClimateCooperation(P-TECC),canbeemployedtofacilitatepublic-privatepartnershipstoraisefinancingandleveragethepoweroftheUSenergyandinfrastructureindustriestoenablelargeprojectsatspeed.TheEuropeanCommissionhasdeliveredmostofthefinancingforimportantgasinterconnectionsinNortheasternEuropeascross-borderProjectsofCommonInterest(PCIs),whichareeligibleforEUfunds.ForprojectssuchasLNGterminals,whosecross-borderimportisnotasapparent,EUfundingisnotassured.Klaip?dawassolelyanationalendeavor,althoughPoland’sGdańskterminalislistedasaPCI.19

EUsupportwillcontinuetoplayacriticalroleinthedevelopmentofthenextwaveofinfrastructurenecessaryto

delink

theEuropeanenergysystem

fromRussia’s,buttherewillbefundinggapswheretheUnitedStatescanstepin.

Forenergy-infrastructureneedsinEurope’snortheast,theUnitedStatescanplayapivotalfinancialrolethroughtheUSInternationalDevelopmentFinanceCorporation(DFC).Underthe2019EuropeanEnergySecurityandDiversificationAct,DFCisempoweredtofinanceenergyinfrastructureinCentralandEasternEurope,despitetheirhigherincomeclassifications,andfundshavealreadybeenpledgedforthispurpose.LastJulyinLatvia,CEOScottNathanannouncedtheDFCwouldprovideupto$300millionforcriticalinfrastructureintheThreeSeasregion,thefirstof$1billionpromisedbytheWhiteHouseunderthepreviousadministration.20

ThisfundingcouldbereleasedwithPresidentBiden’sJune2022delegationofauthoritytotheUSsecretaryofstateunderthe2019EnergyAct.ThisauthoritygivestheUSDepartmentofStateatimelyopportunitytodeployDFCfundingforEuropeanprojectsthatcanpromoteenergysecurity.21

ToeasegeopoliticalsensitivitiesthatcouldarisefromDFCfundinginfrastructureinrelativelyhigh-incomecountries,theinstitution’sfundingallocationfromtheUSgovernmentshouldberaised.2.3ReconcilingdiversifiedgasimportswiththeenergytransitionDiversifyinggasimportsintheshortertermandscalinguprenewable-energycapacityforthelonger-termneednotbeaneither-orproposition.NewinfrastructureinvestmentsmustbemadecompatiblewiththeEuropeanUnion’scommitmenttoachievecarbonneutralityby2050.Thisiscriticalforensuringthesemeasures’politicalviabilityinEuropeandforcomplyingwiththelegallybindingEuropeanClimateLaw,aswellaspreservingEuropeanleadershiponclimate.Moreover,theUnitedStatesmustsquarethecirclebetweenitsstrategicinterestinsafeguardingtheenergysecurityofimportantalliesamidrenewedwarinEuropeandmaintainingmomentumonitsowndrivetoassertinternationalclimateleadership—oneofthiscentury’sdefininggeopoliticalgoals,astheworldcontendswiththeincreasinglydevastatingimpactsofclimatechange.ReplacingRussiangaswithLNGfromothersuppliersiscompatiblewithtransatlanticclimateambitions.AssumingthatEurope’snear-termgasdemandremainsequal,theimplicationsforEurope’soverallemissionspicturewouldberelativelybenign—ifthereplacementgassupplyislessemissionsintensivethanRussiangas,theclimateimpactcouldbeanetpositive.Infact,acrossthesupplychain,USLNGexportsproduceabouthalfthegreenhouse-gasemissions,orfewer,comparedtoRussianpipelineexports,resultinginpotentialclimatebenefitsfromimportreorientation.22

Moreover,LNGcanalsoaccelerateanenergy-securecoal-to-gastransitioninCentralandEasternEuropemorebroadly.US-EUeffortstomitigatetheclimateintensityofnaturalgas,however,mustgofurther.ThetransatlanticLNGtradeshouldincorporaterigorousstandardsonlifecycleemissionstransparency,whichcancreateacompetitiveadvantageforenvironmentallyresponsiblegasproducersunderexistingandfutureemissionstradingregimes.Moreover,theUnitedStatesandEuropemustseizetheopportunitytoalignstandardsforsustainablegasinvestmentundertheEUgreentaxonomyandpromotetechnologicalsolutionsforreducingper-unitemissionsthroughcarboncapture,preventingmethaneleakage,andtransitioningtolower-carbongasessuchashydrogenandbiomethane.Strengthenedtransatlanticenergycollaborationcan,therefore,displaceRussianproductionwithgasfromlower-emittingsources,ensuringthatNortheasternEurope’sdrivetosecurenewgassuppliesdoesnotnegateitsotherenergyprioritiesundertheEuropeanGreenDeal.Naturalgas’inclusionintheEUgreentaxonomyunlocksmoneyfromthesustainable-investmentcommunity,buttheseprojectswillneedtobepairedwithcarbon-reductiontechnologiestomeetthetaxonomy’sstandardof270gramsofcarbondioxide(CO2)equivalentperkilowatthour.Thisrequirementprovidesabusinesscasefordecarbonizingthenaturalgassector.TheUnitedStates’interventionsundertheDFCcantakethisevenfurther.TheDFCisobligedtomakeone-thirdofitsinvestments“climate-focused”infiscalyear2023,andtoattainanet-zeroportfolioby2040.23

Bycombiningitssupportfornaturalgasinfrastructurewithinvestmentsinrenewableprojects,theDFCcansupportanall-of-the-aboveapproachforenergydiversificationintheregion.Moreover,bycollaboratingwithlocalpartnerstoensurenewgasinfrastructureisbuiltwithhydrogencompatibilityinmind,theUnitedStatesandEuropecanreducetherisksofinvestinginfuture“strandedassets”andseetoitthatprojectsenabletheenergytransitionratherthan“l(fā)ockin”naturalgasuse.Inaddition,undertheEUEnergyPlatform,USandEUpartnersmustexplorewaystomitigatetherisksassociatedwithlong-termgascontractsasEuropeattemptstotaperoffitsgasconsumptionbeyond2030byreplacinggaswithrenewables.Thiscouldincludeflexibledestinationprovisions,whichwouldallowfuturecargoestoberedirectedtodevelopingnationssotheycanusegastotransitionawayfromdirtierfossilfuels.AnothermechanismforlesseningfuturecarbonlockincouldbethroughthejointleasingofFSRUs,asmodeledbytheFinnish-EstoniandealwithExcelerateEnergy.Thisapproachwouldmakegasimportinfrastructurelesspermanent.Throughpublic-privatepartnershipslikethese,NortheasternEurope’sshort-andmedium-termgasdiversificationneedscanbereconciledwithitslonger-termneedtobuildasecure,net-zeroenergysystem.2.4DecarbonizationtoadvanceenergysecurityintheregionInadditiontosecuringalternativegassourcesandbuildingnewinfrastructuretofillsupplygapsacrossEurope,theregioncanbolsteritsenergysecuritythroughlarge-scaleinvestmentsinenergy-efficiencyrenovations,renewablegeneration,andenergystorage.Transitioningtoalower-carbonenergysystemwiththesemechanismsisnecessarytoreduceoveralldemandforfossilfuelimports,particularlythosefromRussia,andcanstrengthenregionalenergyindependence.Giventhemonumentalchallengesposedbyreplacing155bcmaofRussiangas,reducingrelianceonthisenergyresourcewillbeanecessarycomponentofdecarbonization.Investmentstoimprovetheenergyefficiencyoftheregion’sagingstockofbuildingscanreducedemandforgasduringthewinterheatingseason,whileofferingsavingstoconsumers.Thistacticrepresentsthelowest-hangingfruitforemissions-reductioneffortstobolsterNortheasternEuropeanenergysecurity.Additionally,renewableenergyinvestmentsinNortheasternEuropecouldtransformtheregionintoacleanenergyexporthubwithinEurope.Cleanelectrificationoftransport,heating,andindustrycangreatlyreduceconsumptionofRussianhydrocarbons,whileamplifyingdemandforcleanpoweracrossEuropeandlayingthefoundationforwind-poweredgreenhydrogenproduction.Astheglobalenergycrisisworsens,Balticstateshaveraisedtheirrenewablegenerationtargetstogainrelieffrompoliticallyinducedpricevolatilityinthefuture.Estoniaincreasedits2030renewablegenerationtargetfrom40percentto100percent,andLithuaniaaccelerateditstimelineforachieving100percentrenewablepowerconsumptionfrom2050to2035.24

Thenewobjectivesarehighlyambitious:in2019,onshorewind,solar,andhydropowermetonly2.6percentofLithuania’stotalprimaryenergydemand,4.6percentofLatvia’s,and1.3percentofEstonia’s—althoughrenewablebioenergycontributesafargreatersharetoregionalenergysystems.25Toachievetheseambitiousrenewableenergygoals,Balticoffshorewind,oneofthegreatestuntappedrenewableresourcesintheregion,willlikelybeamajorcontributor.WindEurope,anindustryassociation,estimatestheBaltics’wind-energypotentialtobe83gigawatts(GW),whichcouldrepresentasignificantportionoftheEU’stotaloffshore-windobjectives.26

Theblocplanstoscaleitsoffshore-windcapacityfrom12GWtoatleast60GWby2030,and300GWby2050.27Sustainedoffshore-winddevelopmentisapriorityfortheEuropeanCommission,andwashighlightedintheEUstrategyonoffshorerenewableenergylaunchedinNovember2020.28

Additionally,becausedeploymentoflarge-scaleoffshorewindisacross-borderendeavor,suchprojectsareusuallyeligibleforEUfundingasPCIs.TheBalticDeclarationforOffshoreWindEnergy,signedinMarch2022,andtheMarienborgDeclarationofAugust2022deliveredavisionforoffshore-winddeploymentintheregionandsentastronginvestmentsignaltotheprivatesector.29Caption:TheEUplanstoscaleitstotaloffshorewindcapacityfrom12GWtoatleast60GWby2030and300GWby2050.TheBalticstatescouldcontribute83GWtowardsthetotal,accordingtoanestimatebyWindEurope,anindustryassociation.

Credit:UnsplashPermitting,however,canbeanobstacletolarge-scalerenewablesdeployment.TheEuropeanUnionhasfourtimesasmuchwindcapacityinthepermittingphasethanintheconstructionphase,atremendousbureaucraticbottleneck.30

Toaddressstalledpermitting,theEuropeanCommission’sREPowerEUplancallsforstreamlinedpermittingtoacceleratedevelopmentofnewtransmissionsystemsandrenewableenergy.Thecommissionhasproposedaone-yearpermittinglimitfornewprojectsandunveiledanewmappingtoolthatidentifies“go-to”areasofminimalenvironmentalrisktoprioritizeforcleanenergyprojects.31Inparallelwithrenewableenergygeneration,theregionwillultimatelyneedlarge-scalebatterydeploymenttostoreenergyandbalancethegrid,withoutrevertingtogasasabaseloadpowersourcetobackupintermittentrenewables.Towardtheseends,Lithuaniaisbuildingoneofthelargestbatterysystemsintheworld,a200-MWcomplex.32Caption:Lithuaniaisbuildingoneofthelargestbatterysystemsintheworldtomaximizerenewableenergygeneration,balancethegrid,andultimately,todesynchronizefromtheRussianpowersystem.Credit:Litgrid2.5USsupportfordecarbonizationofNortheasternEuropeCoordinatingdecarbonizationeffortswiththeUnitedStateswillbepivotaltoacceleratingNortheasternEurope’sdevelopmentofrenewableenergysources.Cost-efficientrenewablesarealreadyreplacinggasforpowergenerationinNortheasternEurope,althoughunderthemerit-orderpricingmodel,gas—asthemostexpensivesourcesatisfyingdemandatpeaktimes—stillsetselectricityprices.Greaterrenewablesoutputcandisplacegasasthemarginalpowerproducertostabilizeelectricityprices.Moreover,furtherrenewables-basedelectrificationcanreduceoverallgasdemandincurrentlyfuel-basedsectorssuchasheatingandindustry.WhileNortheasternEurope,undertheEuropeanGreenDeal,isinmanyrespectsfurtheralongthantheUnitedStatesondecarbonization,synergiescanbeachiev