GENEVA

ASSOCIATION

nternatnaFrfrTrrrRKRnranceP

FTRlpG

Insuranceand

Chemical,Biological,Radiological,and

NuclearRisks

September2025

ASSOCIATION

G\GENEVA

Insuranceand

Chemical,Biological,Radiological,and

NuclearRisks

AjointreportoftheGenevaAssociationandtheInternationalForumofTerrorismRisk(Re)InsurancePools(IFTRIP)

1

GenevaAssociation

TheGenevaAssociationwascreatedin1973andistheonlyglobalassociationof

insurancecompanies;ourmembersareinsuranceandreinsuranceChiefExecutive

Officers(CEOs).Basedonrigorousresearchconductedincollaborationwithour

members,academicinstitutionsandmultilateralorganisations,ourmissionisto

identifyandinvestigatekeytrendsthatarelikelytoshapeorimpacttheinsurance

industryinthefuture,highlightingwhatisatstakefortheindustry;develop

recommendationsfortheindustryandforpolicymakers;provideaplatformtoour

membersandotherstakeholderstodiscussthesetrendsandrecommendations;

andreachouttoglobalopinionleadersandinfluentialorganisationstohighlight

thepositivecontributionsofinsurancetobetterunderstandingrisksandtobuilding

resilientandprosperouseconomiesandsocieties,andthusamoresustainableworld.

Photocredits:

Coverpage–CashMacanayaforUnsplash

GenevaAssociationpublications:

PamelaCorn,DirectorCommunications

HannahDean,Editor&ContentManager

JooinShin,DigitalContent&DesignManager

Suggestedcitation:GenevaAssociationandInternationalForumofTerrorismRisk(Re)InsurancePools(IFTRIP).2025.InsuranceandChemical,Biological,Radiological,andNuclearRisks.

September.

?GenevaAssociation,2025Allrightsreserved

2

Contents

Acknowledgements4

Foreword5

Executivesummary6

1.Introduction8

1.1DefiningCBRN9

1.2RecentCBRNevents10

1.3Catastrophiclosspotential13

1.4Scopeandstructureofthereport17

2.CBRNrisklandscape18

2.1Terroristmotivations19

2.2AccesstoCBRNmaterials19

2.3Newcapabilitiesandinnovation22

2.4CBRNinfrastructurevulnerabilities25

3.ExistingCBRNre/insurancearrangements27

3.1PrimarycoverformaliciousCBRNincidents29

3.2Reinsuranceandretrocession31

3.3Public-privateschemes34

4.Re/insurers’lossexposure36

4.1Modelledscenarioinsurancelossestimates39

4.2Beyondbetterriskmodels41

5.Conclusionsandrecommendations42

5.1DevelopbestpracticesamongIFTRIPmembers43

5.2Exploreexpandedinternationalreciprocationarrangements44

5.3Strengthendialoguebetweenre/insurersandinternationalpolicymakers44

Appendix1–NuclearThreatInitiativeSecurityScores45

Appendix2–Detaileddirtybomblossscenario(France)47

References52

3

4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThisreportwaspreparedasajointeffortbetweentheGenevaAssociationandtheInternationalForumofTerrorismRisk(Re)InsurancePools(IFTRIP).Editorialcontributionswereprovidedinparticularby:

?SinaNassiryandCorentinGouache(CaisseCentraledeRéassurance)

?FrédéricGuyomard(ElectricitédeFrance)

?StaffoftheFederalInsuranceOffice(FIO),USDepartmentoftheTreasury

?DarrenPain(GenevaAssociation)

?CarmenMacDougall,HayleySeverance,andScottRoecker(NuclearThreatInitiative)

?SteveBurr(PoolRe)

Thisreporthasalsobenefittedsignificantlyfrominputsandcommentsfromvariousinsurers,brokers,andotherIFTRIPmemberorganisations.

Foreword

ThisjointreportoftheGenevaAssociationandInternationalForumofTerrorism

Risk(Re)InsurancePools(IFTRIP)offersatimelyandcomprehensiveanalysisoftheimplicationsofchemical,biological,radiological,andnuclear(CBRN)riskforthe

re/insurancesector.ThoughCBRNmaliciousincidentsare,thankfully,rare,their

potentialconsequencesareuniquelycatastrophic.Emergingtechnologiessuchas

dronesandbioengineeringareloweringthebarriersforviolentnon-stateactors

(VSNAs)toaccessandoperationaliseCBRNmaterials.CBRNeventshavethepowertodestabilisesocietiesandeconomiesinwaysfewotherthreatscan,andraise

seriousquestionsaboutpreparedness,response,andfinancialresilience.

ThereportidentifiessignificantgapsintraditionalcoverageforCBRN-related

losses,withwidevariationinhowexistingnationalinsurancepoolsapproachthe

threat.StrengtheningCBRNresiliencewilldemandgreaterdialogueandcooperationbetweengovernments,insurers,nationalpools,andinternationalpolicyorganisations,onconcretemechanismstobetterassessandmanagerisks.

Againstthatbackground,thisreportalsooutlinespracticalpathwaystohelpnarrowtheCBRNprotectiongap,improvemodellingandscenarioplanningcapabilities,andlaythegroundworkforlonger-terminnovativesolutions,notablyincross-borderrisk-sharing.Wehaveanopportunitytoboostsocietalresilience:byactingnow,theglobalre/insurancecommunitycanhelpmitigateCBRNrisksandensurethatfutureCBRNincidentsdonotresultindevastatinghumanlossormassiveeconomicdislocation.

JadAriss

ManagingDirector,GenevaAssociation

StevenSeitz

Chair,IFTRIP

Director,FederalInsuranceOffice(FIO),USDepartmentoftheTreasury

5

6

Executivesummary

CBRNrisksareagrowingthreattosociety,and

thelimitedabilityofre/insurerstoabsorbthem

createsasignificantprotectiongap.Innovative

public-privatemechanismswouldboostresilienceandmitigatepotentialeconomicdisruption.

Thethreatposedbychemical,biological,radiological,

andnuclear(CBRN)incidents–particularlythose

stemmingfromterrorism–isacriticalconcernfor

policymakersandthere/insuranceindustry.Whilesucheventsarerare,therapidlyevolvingthreatlandscape,

markedbyrisinggeopoliticaltensions,emerging

technologiesandincreasinglycapableviolentnon-stateactors(VNSAs),demandssustainedvigilanceand

strategicriskmanagement.In2021,theUKGovernmentwarnedthatasuccessfulterroristCBRNattackislikelyby2030–anindicationofgrowinguneaseaboutthe

escalationofglobalCBRNthreats.

CBRNincidentsremainrarebut

risinggeopoliticaltensionsandnew

technologiesareescalatingthreatlevels.

Themajorlossaccumulationpotentialassociatedwith

largeCBRN-relatedincidentshastypicallyrestrained

privatere/insurersfromcoveringsuchrisks,except

whenpropertycoverageismandatory(suchasin

FranceandSpain).Thescaleanduncertaintyof

possiblelossesfaroutstripwhatthere/insurancesectorcansafelyandsensiblyunderwrite.Asaresult,most

traditionalpropertyandcasualty(P&C)policies,as

wellascorrespondingreinsurancecontracts,exclude

coverageforCBRN-relatedlossesorheavilysublimittherisk.Instead,differentrisk-sharingarrangementshave

emergedtopoolandspreadCBRNexposuresacrossmultiplebalancesheets,bothprivateandpublic.

However,shouldamajorincidentoccur,innocentvictimswouldfacesignificantfinancialhardshipanddisruption.

Suchaneventwouldlikelyplacesignificantburdenson

theresourcesofnational,regional,andlocalgovernmentstoorganisearecovery,meetanyshortfallinfinance,andcompensatevictims,whichinturncouldtriggerfiscal

strainsandpossiblemacroeconomicinstability.

ThepotentialscaleanduncertaintysurroundinglossesfromaCBRN

incidentlimithowfarre/insurerscancovertheserisks.

ThisreportassessesrecentshiftsintheCBRNrisk

environmentandtheexistingmechanismsavailableto

managetheseexposures.Morespecifically,itreviews

thecurrentinsurancearrangementstorespondtomali-ciousCBRNattacks,determinewhatgapsexistinCBRNcoveragewithinnationalre/insurancepools,andexplorefuturedirectionsforupgradingCBRNriskmanagementframeworks.

ThereportfocusesonCBRNterrorismrisksrelevanttoP&Cinsurance,particularlyattacksbyVNSAsinvolvingCBRNweaponsortargetingCBRNfacilities/distributors.Itprovides:

●AnanalysisofthechangingCBRNthreatlandscape(section2),includingmotivations,capabilities,andaccessbyVNSAstoCBRNmaterialsandfacilities,

withattentiontotheproliferationoftechnologieslikedrones,AI,andbioengineeringthatcouldenable

moresophisticatedattacks.

●Areviewofexistingre/insurancearrangements(section3),particularlythenationalre/insurancepoolsthathavebeenformedtoallowinsurerstosharenuclearandterrorismrisks,highlighting

differencesinCBRNcoverageacrosscountries.

●Insightsintoriskmodellingpractices(section4),showinghowinsurersandnationalpoolsuse

scenariosimulationstoassesspotentialCBRNimpactsontheirunderwritingportfolios.

7

Inconcluding(section5),thereportdiscussespossibleinitiativestohelpnarrowtheimpliedCBRNprotection

gap,improveCBRNriskmanagement,andreducetheeconomicimpactsofpotentialCBRNterroristincidents.

Someareasforfutureconsiderationinclude:

●Sharingbestpracticesamongnationalterrorism

pools,includingexperiencesusingalternative

fundingarrangements,andsponsoringterrorismriskmodellingeducationandtraining.

●Exploringexpandedinternationalreciprocation

arrangementsforterrorismpoolslikethoseusedin

thenuclearpowerindustry(althoughthecurrentlackofstandardisedterrorismcoverageandthenationalscopeofexistingpoolsislikelyamajorconstraint).

●Fosteringgreaterdialoguebetweenre/insurers,

governments,andinternationalpolicymakersaboutCBRNexposuresandinnovativemechanismsto

shareassociatedrisks.

1Introduction

8

9

Introduction

CBRNthreatshavelongbeenaconcernforpolicymakersandre/insurersgiventhepotentialforlong-termsocialand

economicharmfromsuchincidents.

Thethreatfromamajorchemical,biological,radiological,and/ornuclear(CBRN)incidenthaslongconcerned

policymakersandre/insurers.Thepotentialscaleof

destruction/disruptioncausedbysuchanincidentand

thefalloutonhouseholds,businesses,andtheirinsurersunderscoresthesocietalimportanceoftheissue.

Amidrisinggeopoliticaltensionsandconcernsabout

theambitionandcapabilitiesofterroristorganisationstodeployCBRNweapons,thisreportassessesrecentshiftsintheCBRNrisklandscapeandtheexisting

mechanismsavailabletomanagetheserisks.More

specifically,itreviewsthecurrentinsurancearrange-

mentstorespondtoCBRN-relatedperils,determines

whatgapsexistinCBRNre/insuranceandnational

poolcoverage,andsuggestspossiblewaystoupgradeCBRNriskmanagementframeworks.

1.1DefiningCBRN

Sincethe1990s,incidentsrelatedtochemical,biolog-

ical,radiological,andnuclearagentsthatcouldcause

harmthroughtheiraccidentalordeliberaterelease,

dissemination,orimpactshavebeenreferredtoas

CBRNthreatsorevents.Theterm‘CBRN’datesbacktothecoldwarera,whereitwasfirstreferredtoasABC

(atomic,biological,chemical)andlaterasNBC(nuclear,biological,chemical).

TherearevariousdistinctclassesofCBRNagents

(Table1).Thehealtheffectsofanagentdependon

severalcharacteristicsthatimpactnotonlythenumberandtypeofcasualtiesbutalsohowitisdelivered,the

typeofemergencymedicalresponse,thephysical

protectionrequiredbyresponders,andotherresourcesthatmightbeneededsuchasdecontaminationcapabili-tiesorisolationareas.1

1Anagent’sphysicalpropertiescanvaryacrossclassesandinfluencekeyattackfactorsincludingtheoptimaldeliverysystem,routeofexposure,spreadandongoingpresenceintheenvironment(persistency),andthetimingoftheonsetofeffects

(latency).See

Bland2013

.

10

TABLE1:CLASSESOFCBRNAGENTS

Agent

Mainclasses

Chemical

Nerveagents–highlypoisonouschemicalsthatworkbypreventingthenervoussystemfromworkingproperly.

Blisteragents–chemicalcompoundsthatcausesevereskin,eye,andmucosalpainandirritation.

Cyanides(akabloodagents)–toxicchemicalagentsthataffectthebodybybeingabsorbedintotheblood.

Choking/lung/pulmonaryagents–chemicalsthatcausesevereirritationorswellingoftherespiratorytract(liningofthenose,throat,andlungs).

Biological

Liveagentssuchasbacteria,includingrickettsiaandchlamydia,virusesandfungi.

Toxins–chemicalagentsthatareofbiologicaloriginandincludethosederivedfrombacteria,fungi,plants,andanimals(venom).

Radiological

Ionisingradiation–subatomicparticlesorelectromagneticwavesthathavesufficientenergytocausedamagetocellsandgeneticmaterial.Typesincludealpha,beta,andneutronparticles;gammarays;andX-rays.

Nuclear

Materialinvolvedinthenuclearpowerorweaponindustry,orhavingfissileproperties(i.e.capableofundergoingfissionandgeneratingenergy,fissionproducts,and

neutronemissions).

Source:GenevaAssociationbasedonBlandandotherpubliclyavailablesources2

1.2RecentCBRNevents

MaliciousincidentsinvolvingCBRNmaterialsremainrare.Accordingtosomeexperts,CBRNterrorism

accountedforlessthan0.25%ofallterroristattacks

globallybetween1970and2021.3However,whilethe

numberofCBRNattackshavegenerallybeendecliningoverthepasttwodecades(seeBox1),thethreatfromviolentnon-stateactors(VNSAs)persistsandmayevenbeworsening.

Box1:Violentnon-stateactorsandCBRNattacks

TheVSNACBRNDatabase4providesanhistorical

recordofCBRNeventsasdocumentedfrommedia

reportsandotherterrorismeventsources.VNSAshavebeendescribedas“anyindividual,groupofindividuals,ororganizationwillingandcapableofengaginginillicitactsandunsanctionedviolencetoachievetheirgoals.

Theyneitherdirectlynorofficiallyrepresentarecognisedstate,buttheymaybesupportedbystateactors.”5Thisincludesterroristorganisations,drugtraffickingcartels,transnationalcriminalgangs,insurgents,andparamili-

tarygroups.Suchactorsarenormallydistinct,althoughtherecanbeoverlapand,insomecases,they

mayshareresourcesandcapabilitiestoaccomplishtheirrespectivegoals.

Overtheperiod1990–2023thedatabaselists566

CBRNVNSA‘events’,with379involvingchemical

agents,75involvingbiologicalagents,40involving

radiologicalagents,11involvingnuclearagents,and61involvingmultipleagents(seeFigure1).Ofthesedocu-mentedevents,overhalf(293)werenotsuccessfulindeployingCBRNagentsbutwereplannedattacksthatwerediscoveredbeforetheywerecarriedoutorplotsintheearlystagesofdevelopment.

2

Bland2013

.

3

CHCGlobal2023

.

4

UniversityofMaryland(n.d.)

5

Tinetal.2023

.

11

FIGURE1:NUMBEROFCBRNEVENTSBYAGENT(1990–2023)

60

50

NumberofCBRNevents

40

30

20

10

0

52

33

31

30

30

28

26

27

24

26

20

19

19

19

22

17

18

16

13

13

14

12

10

6

66

87

5

3

4

1

01

1990199520002005201020152020

ChemicalBiologicalRadiologicalNuclearMulti-agent

Source:UniversityofMaryland6

Duringthesameperiod,thedatabaseshows273attacksinvolvingthesuccessfuldeploymentofCBRNagents,withnearly90%involvingchemicalagents(244).Whilefewerinnumber,therehavealsobeensuccessfulCBRNattacksinvolvingbiological(21),radiological(2),andmultipleagents(6)includingnuclear.TherehaveonlybeentwosuccessfulCBRNattackssince2017,bothinvolvingbiologicalagentsin2020.

FIGURE2:NUMBEROFSUCCESSFULCBRNVNSAATTACKS(1990–2023)

35

NumberofsuccessfulCBRNVNSAattacks

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

33

22

17

16

12

13

12

12

11

9

12

13

13

11

4

7

6

6

4

5

6

7

5

7

5

0

2

1

2

00000

1990199520002005201020152020

ChemicalBiologicalRadiologicalNuclearMulti-agent

Source:UniversityofMaryland7

CBRNattackshavecumulativelycaused8,629casualties,including980deathsand7,649injuries(Table2);

however,somewerecausedbynon-CBRNagentssuchasgunsandbombs.CBRNagentsalonehavecaused6,140casualties,including453deathsand5,687injuries,withmostcomingfromchemicalagents(6,036or98.3%).

6

UniversityofMaryland(n.d.)

7

Ibid

.

12

TABLE2:SUCCESSFULCBRNATTACKSANDCASUALTIESBYAGENT(1990–2023)

Agent(s)

Total

attacks

No.killed

(all)

No.

wounded

(all)

Total

casualties

(all)

No.killed

(CBRN)

No.

wounded

(CBRN)

Total

casualties

(CBRN)

Chemical

240

961

7,540

8,501

438

5,598

6,036

Biological

23

15

59

74

15

39

54

Radiological

4

0

50

50

0

50

50

Nuclear

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Multiple

6

4

0

4

0

0

0

Total

273

980

7,649

8,629

453

5,687

6,140

Source:UniversityofMaryland8

Ofthe273totalattacks,207(76%)tookplacein10countries(Table3)andmostoccurredintheUS(50).Alltold,attackshaveoccurredin44countries.

WhilehavingthehighestnumberofCBRNattacks,theUSexperiencedfewcasualties(132),withnearlyall

deathsrecordedassociatedwithoneevent–the2001‘Amerithrax’attack.NocasualtiesfromCBRNattackshaveoccurredinanycountrysince2017.

TABLE3:SUCCESSFULCBRNATTACKSANDCASUALTIESBYCOUNTRY(1990–2023)

Country

Total

attacks

Percent

totalattacks

(CBRN)

No.killed

(CBRN)

No.

wounded

(CBRN)

Total

CBRN

casualties

Percenttotal

casualties

(CBRN)

US

50

18%

5

127

132

2%

Iraq

34

12%

53

1,436

1,489

24%

Japan

27

10%

41

1,345

1,386

23%

China

22

8%

1

154

155

3%

Afghanistan

19

7%

12

987

999

16%

Cambodia

16

6%

228

507

735

12%

Russia

11

4%

44

202

246

4%

Colombia

10

4%

12

8

20

0%

Syria

9

3%

1

159

160

3%

SriLanka

9

3%

1

27

28

0%

Totaltop10

207

76%

398

4,952

5,350

87%

Other(34countries)

66

24%

55

735

790

13%

Total(all)

273

100%

453

5,687

6,140

100%

Source:UniversityofMaryland9

Source:ContributedbyFIO

8

UniversityofMaryland(n.d.)

9

Ibid

.

13

Somecommentatorshighlightthatthenumberof

reportsofpropagandaandsuspectedterroristattackpreparationsinvolvingCBRNmaterialsisincreasing.10ParticularlyinEurope,arrestsforsuspectedattack

preparationusingchemicalmaterialsand/ortoxins

haveoccurredinthelasttwoyears.Ineverycase,theindividualswerearrestedbeforeacquiringtheneces-saryresourcesandknowledgetocarryoutanattack.

Thetoxicmaterialsinvolvedwereprimarilyhydrogencyanideandricin.

Forexample,in2022,itwasreportedthata16-year-oldboyinNorway–motivatedbyIslamicStateideology

–hadmanufacturednicotinepoisoninhisgarage.11

Similarly,inGermanyinearly2023,policearresteda

32-year-oldIranianmaninthecityofCastrop-Rauxel

forallegedlyplottinganislamist-motivatedattackusingcyanideandricin.12,13,14Earlierthatyear,amanidentifiedastheUKcellleaderofthetransnationalneo-NazigroupFeuerkriegDivision(FKD),wassentencedtonineyearsandthreemonthsinprisonforterrorismoffencesintheUK,whichincludedresearchintotheuseofpoisons.15

Moregenerally,concernsaboutnationalsecurityand

safetyfrominadequatecontrolorviolentuseofCBRN

materialsareintensifying.Threatsincludeintentional

attacksbystateandnon-stateactors(e.g.terrorist

movements),aswellastheuseofCBRNagentsfor

smaller-scalecrimes.In2021,theUKGovernmentmadethealarmingpredictionthat“itislikelythataterrorist

groupwilllaunchasuccessfulCBRNattackby2030.”16

10

SwedishDefenceResearchAgency2024

.

11

CHCGlobal2023

.

12

Radford2023

.

RisingCBRNrisksstemfromintentionalattacks,accidentalrelease,andweaksecuritysafeguards.

TheproliferationofpotentiallyhazardousCBRNmate-

rialsindifferentindustriesalsoraisestheprospectoftheunintentionalreleaseofandexposuretosuchagents.

AccordingtotheNuclearThreatInitiative(NTI),34%

ofcountries/areashavenoregulatoryrequirementstoprotecttheirnuclearinfrastructure/materialsduringa

naturalorhuman-causeddisaster,andprogresstowardanimprovedsecuritycultureatnuclearfacilitieshas

almostgroundtoahalt.17Thisisoccurringasmany

countrieslooktonuclearpowergenerationasapoten-tialalternativetofossilfuels.Similarly,94%ofcountrieshavenonational-leveloversightforthedualuse(i.e.

civilianandmilitary)ofbioscience/biotechnology.18

1.3Catastrophiclosspotential

WhilefocusonfatalitiesandbodilyinjuriesinthewakeofamaliciousCBRNattackisnatural,itlikelyonly

scratchesthesurfaceofthepotentialimpact.Pastinci-dents–althoughrare–indicatethattheactualnumberofdeathswaslow(seeTables2and3),surprisingly

sogiventhetoxicityofthematerialinvolved.19More

broadly,thesocioeconomicandhumanimpactsofsucheventsencompassdirectandindirecteffects,bothof

whichcangiverisetoshort-termandlong-termcosts(seeTable4).

13Someextremistgroupsespousethe‘a(chǎn)ccelerationist’philosophy–theideathatpoliticalgoalscanbeachievedonlyviasocialcollapse.Oneexampleistheneo-NaziAtomwaffengroup,whichbelievesthatmodern,post-industrialsocietycannotbe

redeemed.Instead,itsadherentsthinkmodernsocietyoughttobedrivenintoapocalypticcollapsesoawhiteethno-stateorwhites-onlyutopiacanbeconstructedinitswake.InFebruary2023,AtomwaffenleaderBrandonRussellandanothermemberofthegroupwerechargedwithattemptingtoblowuptheBaltimorepowergrid.See

Wendling2023

.

14AsocialmediapostbyRussellindicatedthathehadknowledgeofhowtobuildanuclearbombandmayhavebeeninvolvedinplanstoattacktheTurkeyPointnuclearpowerplantinHomestead,Floridain2018.See

Reitman2018

.

15

BBC2023

.

16

HMGovernment2021

.

17

NTI2023a

.

18

Millet2024

.

19

IntegrityInitiative2019

.

14

TABLE4:SOCIOECONOMICANDHUMANIMPACTOFCBRNEVENTS

Timeframe

Direct

Indirect

Shortterm

Crisisresponsecosts(includingemergencyservices)

Socialupheavalincommunities

Damagedgoods,destroyed

property,damagedinfrastructure

Reducedbusinesstradinginthevicinityofanincident,includingevacuatedareasandthoseaffectedbyany

government-imposedshutdowns

Casualtiesandbodilyinjuries

Knock-oneffectsoneconomicsupplychains,bothupstream(suppliers)anddownstream(customers)

Costsofdecontaminationandreparation

Reducedconsumertraffic,resultinginreducedactivity

Businessinterruptioncosts

Longterm

Long-lastinghealth(physicalandmental)issuesforvictims,e.g.

post-traumaticstressdisorder

Lowerpotentialeconomicgrowthfrompostponed/cancelledbusinessinvestment,includingforeigndirectinvestment

Permanentenvironmentalcontamination

‘Psychologicalcontamination’givingrisetofearanduncertainty,whichdetersspendinginaregion(e.g.inboundtourism)

Increasedtransactioncostsassociatedwithheightenedsecuritymeasures

Source:GenevaAssociation

ThefullextentofanyharmfromCBRNagentsneednotsolelyarisefrompropertydamageormasscasualtiesordestruction.CBRNhazardshavehistoricallyproduced

widespreaddreadwithinsocieties,whichcanhave

extensivesocial,macroeconomic,andenvironmental

effects.Theseincludetheimpactonpublicconfidenceanddisruptiontonormaleconomiclife,ontopofthe

restorationanddecontaminationcostsinaffectedand

surroundingareas.Inaddition,unlikemoreconventionalterroristbombattacks,smallarmsattacks,orindustrialacci