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JoinUsonOurJourney:ExploringBusiness

ModelFusioninLodging&Cruise

GivenstarkdifferencesinshareperformanceandvaluationsamongtheLodgingandCruisestocks,weexplorewaystheseindustriescanconverge.OuranalysisimpliesgreaterchangeopportunitiesforCruisethroughpartnerships,franchising,capitalstructureandM&A.Keytakes:1)transformationalfeegrowthof~30%onavg.forHLT,MAR,H,WHthroughfusionwithCruise,2)30%-60%valuationupsideforCCL,NCLH,RCL,VIKthroughintegratedstrategies.

Athousand-milejourneybeginswithasinglestep.Wepursuedalong-termhypothetical

explorationoftheprospectiveconvergenceofLodgingandCruise,whichwebelievehasvery

specificsynergies.Whetheritbethroughaffiliationdeals,franchising,orasset-lighterstructures,

webelievethatthereexistsearlyevidencethatthesestrategiesarealreadyunderway.Most

importantly,thesestrategiesprovidekeypositivesforboththeLodgingC-corpsandCruiselines,

includinghighervaluations.

ThemostobviousareawhereLodgingismoreevolvedthanCruise,inourview,iscustomer

acquisition.Webelievethatthereissignificantcostsavingspotentialforcruiselinesof~

$40M-$130M,whichweestimatederive5%-35%oftheirbookingsthroughtravelagentsatLDD

commissionrates.Meanwhile,theongoingquesttoincreasetheNUGTAMforLodgingC-corps

couldbeaugmentedby~550KtotalberthsbetweenCCL,RCL,NCLH,andVIK.Meanwhile,our

analysissuggeststhatLodgingcouldsee~$50Mto$130Minincrementalfees(HSDimprovement

vs.current)throughaffiliationdealsorasmuchas~$500Mto$1.85Binnewfeesthrough

franchisingarrangements(~50%upliftvs.current),withcruiselinesseeingupto~$800Mto$3.3B

(+15%)inincrementalrevenuefromthosesamefranchisingdeals.

Lighteningthecapitalload.Wealsohypothesizetheprospectsforcruiselinespursuingmore

asset-lightgrowth,aswithotherhospitalityareas.Giventhehighcostofships($400M-$2B),the

prospectsforotherlowercost-of-capitalentitiestofundownershipandmaintenanceofbothships

andprivateislandscouldprovehighlyaccretive.Wehaveexploredbothsale/leasebackandbrand/

assetbifurcationstructures,becausethecurrentlodgingmodelhasprovenmoreproductivefora

rangeofreasons.Ultimately,theabilitytogrowatlowcapitalcostdriveslowerleverage,andshould

positionvaluationstoexpandfrom7x-8xforthesenamesto10x+.

Thevirtuesofcapitalrecycling.Wealsoconsideredthenotionthatcurrentlyownedassetscould

berecycledonalimitedbasistoreduceleverage.AshasbeenthecaseinLodging,maritimeassets

couldbesoldtootherentities,whileretainingtheirmanagementandbrandedpresencethrough

franchiseormanagementagreements.Wesuggestthattheaccretionofsellingshipsat7x-12x

multipleswhileretainingfranchiseormanagementagreementsislikelytoliftenterprisemultiples

byatleast1x-3x.ThesetransactionshaveprovenhistoricallyhighlyproductiveinLodging.

CouldthevaluationdifferentialbeusedtodriveM&A?TheincrementalgrowthforLodging

supportshigherNUGthanpresentlycontemplatedandthereforeincrementallyhighervaluations

of1x-2xonEBITDA.ForCruise,thecurrentlevelsof7.5x-12.0xonEBITDAcouldalsoincrease

initiallyby30%-60%,leadingtoequityvalues~35%higheronaverage.Finally,weconsiderthenotion

thatasset-lightercruiselinescouldpositionthecompaniesforprospectivemergerswithLodging

operatorsovertheverylongtermwith21%accretionbyourmath.

Chart1-C-CorpsCouldSeeMeaningfulFee

UpliftFromCruise

C-CorpEst.FeesfromCruises($M)

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

$129.0

$1,856.1

RCL

$91.0

$1,318.2

NCLH

$52.7

$728.0

VIK

$49.1

$543.6

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

Chart2-NUGGrowthFromCruiseSurpasses

MostOtherOptions

NUGGrowth

CCL

RCL

NCLH

VIK

MAR

25%

17%

7%

2%

HLT

21%

14%

6%

2%

H

78%

52%

21%

8%

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

Chart3-C-CorpLoyaltyWouldLikelyImprove

CruiseEffectiveRevPAR

$97

$87

$61$64

$0

CCLRCLVIKMARHLT

Source:CompanyData,STR,JefferiesEstimates

1)Hexcludedduetocomparibilityissues.

Chart4-CruiseCouldSeeMeaningfulAdj.

EBITDAImprovementFromFranchiseDeals

Est.CruiseEBITDAfromC-CorpDeal($M)

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

$93.4

$1,563.4

RCL

$65.5

$1,032.2

NCLH

$35.7

$603.7

VIK

$19.9

$312.4

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

Chart5-CCLWouldLikelySeeMeaningful

EBITDALiftFromC-CorpLoyalty

$0

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

Chart6-NCLHTryingSomeAsset-Light

WouldLikelyProvideMeaningfulEquityValue

NCLHIncreaseinEquityValuefrom

AssetLight

AssetLightShips

2

4

6

EV/EBITDA

MultipleIncrease

1.0x

35.3%

38.4%

41.5%

2.0x

67.9%

71.3%

74.7%

3.0x

100.5%

104.2%

108.0%

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

DavidKatz*|EquityAnalyst

(212)323-3355|dkatz@

AnthonyBerni,CFA*|EquityAssociate

+1(646)805-5496(office)|aberni@

RitaChen*|EquityAssociate

(212)336-6693|rita.chen@

RyanMcGeary*|EquityAssociate

(212)778-8968|rmcgeary@

$88

$50

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*JefferiesLLC/JefferiesResearchServices,LLC

JefferiesEquityRi

June10,2025

TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary

3

Partnerships,Affiliations,Franchising

and

4

BoostingCruiseRevPARThroughPartnershipsWithC-CorpLoyaltyPrograms

7

HigherRevPAR=HigherRevenue,SometimesaLotHigher

8

TheFeesAreWellWorthIt

10

AShifttoAsset-LightCouldCCLNCLH

BeHighlyAccretive,Particularlyforand

12

Private-BothaGameaPotentialATM

IslandsChangerand

14

SellingOlderShipsReducesLeverageImprovesEquityValue

and

14

DreamingBigonM&A

15

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ExecutiveSummary

Chart7-Lodging&CruiseConvergence

Aswehaveexpandedourcoverageofthecruiselinesovertherecentpast,webelievethatthere

aresignificantsynergiesavailablebetweenLodgingandCruise.Thesesynergiescouldbeinthe

formofpartnerships,franchiseagreements,managementcontracts,orothersnotyetcontemplated.

ThekeyelementsoftheLodgingC-corpstrategies,includingasset-lightstructures,loyaltyprogram

drivendemand,andtechnologicalengagementshouldbeapplicabletoCruise,resultinginlower

leverage,capitalreturns,andhighervaluations.

AsforLodging,NUGhasproventhekeyearningsandvaluationdriveroverthepastseveralyears,

whileRevPARhasbeenanemicandlessrelevant.AswehavepreviouslyindicatedthegrowthinNUG

recurs,whileRevPARismomentaryandcyclical.NUGalsofuelsgrowthintheloyaltymembership

base,whichfurthergrowsthevalueofnon-RevPARfees.Thepotentialadditionofcruiseitineraries

wouldbringprospectivelyupto~550KberthsfromCCL,RCL,NCLH,andVIK,whichasanexample

wouldaddanywherefrom200bpsto5,000bpsofavailableNUGtoMARorHLT,oramuchfuller

800bpstonearly8,000bpstoH.Intotal,thisfeeopportunitycouldrangefrom$50M-$130Mona

smalleraffiliatedeal,orashighas$540Mto$1.85Bonalargerfranchisedeal.

Weexplorethesesynergiesintermsof1)feeopportunitiesforC-corpsfromaffiliationorfranchising

deals,2)asset-lightgrowthforcruiselinesthroughincrementalshipsonanasset-lightbasis,and

3)capitalrecyclingforcruiselines,bysellingshipsand/orprivateislandsandretainingfranchiseorSource:Jefferiesmanagementcontracts.

Thereasoningforpursuingthesestrategiesisultimatelyvaluecreation.Forcruiselines,theability

togrowitscapacityatlowercapitalintensity,toyielditscapacityathigherlevels,andtoengage

withcustomersatlowercostandhigherefficiencyareallvalue-drivingendeavorsthatwoulddrive

highervaluations.Forlodging,theabilitytocontinuegrowingthescopeofitsavailableproductis

aclearaspiration.

Ourconfidenceishighthatthedynamicswedescribeareeventuallyrealisticgivenexamplesin

thecurrentmarketplace.First,MARandotherluxurybrandshaveengagedinlargeyachts,asinits

recentlaunchoftheIlma,aRitzCarltonyacht,onwhichithasafranchiseagreement.Thevesselis

ownedandmanagedbyaconsortiumofthree-OaktreeCapitalManagement,MohariHospitality,and

thegovernmentofSingapore.Further,WHannouncedapartnershipwithCCLforbookingcruises

throughitsloyaltyprogramforwhichitreceivesacommissiononbookingsdonethroughtheWHR

travelbundle.Finally,webelievethatthereisanend-marketforshipsgiventhatNCLHwillbeleasing

outfourofitsoldershipsonlong-termcharteragreementsstartingin2026,withtheintenttosell

thevesselsatthecompletionoftheagreement.

Valuationimprovementisultimatelythefocusforbothgroups.Inthecaseofcruiselines’stocks,

whicharecurrentlytradingat7x-12x2026EBITDA,theabilitytogrowthroughassetlighterstrategies

andacquiringcustomersatgreaterefficiencycouldbesignificant.ForLodging,thekeydebatewith

investorsisthesustainabilityandgrowthofNUG,whichisakeydriverofvaluationsinthemidto

highteensoverthepastseveralyears.

Finally,weconsiderthehypotheticalnotionofwhetherthesecompaniescouldconsidermerging.

Whilewedonotcontemplatespecificpairings,thepremiseofhighervaluationsonthelodgingside

positionsthemasthesuitorsvs.cruiselinesasthetargets.C-corpshaveproventobeexpertat

deliveringvaluetoassetowners,operators,andcustomersonalargescale,whilethecruiselines

haveprovenexpertatdeliveringavaluepropositionforleisuretravelers.Asaresult,webelievethat

intheverylongterm,apairingcouldprovetobemutuallybeneficial.

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Partnerships,Affiliations,andFranchising

Aswethinkaboutthekeyfocusareasofbothcruiselinesandlodgingbrands,cruiselinesarekeenly

focusedonyieldsperberth.Withinthisistheratepaidbycustomers,theonboardandotherspending,

theoccupancyrate,andthecoststoproducetheserevenues.Webelievethatthereareseveral

questionsraisedbyourexerciseinthiscontext.Canthevolumeopportunityofanarrangementwith

alargelodgingbranddrivehigherpricingwhilemaintainingthecomparativelylessexpensivevalue

propositioninherenttocruiseitineraries?Cantherelationshipbetweenacruiselineandahotelbrand

savecommissionspaidthroughotherchannels,especiallytravelagents?

Withrespecttothevolumeopportunity,weshouldconsiderthenotionthatthecustomerbasesofthe

majorhotelbrandsincludebusinesstravelersaswellasleisure,althoughthemembershipbasesof

thevariousloyaltyprogramsprovideaccesstosignificantscale.In2024,thenumberofpassengers

carriedbythemajorcruiselinesisbetween0.7Mand13.5M,whiletheloyaltymembershiplevels

areashighas237Mand218MforMarriottBonvoyandHiltonHonors,respectively,whileWorldof

Hyatthasnearly50Mmembersaswell.Thehighbrandloyalty,suchasMarriottBonvoy’s72%of

USroomnightpenetrationand65%globalroomnightpenetrationin2024,andHiltonHonors’64%

occupancy,presentsameaningfulopportunityforcruises.

Animportantaspectofthebrandscalebroughtbylodgingcompaniesisthebookingand

engagementcapabilitiesthroughtechnology,whichcruiselinesarestillevolving.Thecurrentability

forameaningfulportionoflodgingbookingsandtransactionstooccurthroughbrandedapps

continuestogrow.Asforchanneldistribution,Marriotthasreached73%ofdirectbookings,including

38%ofdigitalbookings,halfofwhichcomefromAppbookings(19%oftotalbookings).Although

cruisebookingsaremorecomplex,primarilyforfirst-timecruisers,repeatcustomers,aswellas

ongoingengagementandinteractionsthroughoutitineraries,shouldbeenhancedovertimethrough

technology.Inshort,cruiselinesarenotnearlyasadvancedaslodgingcompaniesinthisarea,and

apartnershipcouldprovidemeaningfuluplift.

Intheirsimplestform,partnershipsbetweenbrandedhotelsandcruiselinesforbookingand

loyaltypurposesareproductive.AccordingtotheannouncementbyWHandCCLon3/26/25,WH

customerscanbookthroughitstravelbundlesplatformandearnpointsintheWHsystem.According

tothecompany,customersearnpointsonqualifyingcruises,whichareredeemableforfuturefree

anddiscountednightsatWHhotelswhilebookingthroughWyndhamTravelBundles.

AffiliationdealshavebecomemorerelevantinthepastfewyearsthroughHLT’sarrangementwith

SLHandMAR’sarrangementwithMGMinLasVegas.Wealsobringforththerecentpartnership

betweenWHandCCL,whichoffersaneffectivecommissionthroughthebookingsgenerated

throughthechannel.Weconsidertheseopportunitiestobeaccretiveforallconcerned,aswewalk

throughourassumptionsandcalculations.Forexample,inchart9,weshowtheNUGopportunity

forMAR&HLTrangesfrom~2%onapartnershipwithVIK,toasmuchas25%onapartnership

withCCL.Additionally,thefeerevenuefromanaffiliatedealwouldprovideaLSDtoMSDupliftto

MAR'sorHLT'sfees(orMSDtoLDDforH),regardlessofthecruiseoperatorthattheypartnerwith

(Chart10).Onthecruiseoperatorsideoftheledger,affiliatedealsarealsoaccretive,asweassumea

modestupliftoncruiseADRfromawiderpotentialcustomerbase,andthereplacementofaportion

ofexpensivetravelagentbookingsthroughthelodgingaffiliatesystem.

Franchisingdealsareamorecompletearrangement,wherebythereisafull4-6%ofthebooking’s

revenuethatispaidbythecruiselinetothehotelbrandasaroyalty.Inaddition,thereareadditional

feespaidasplatformfees,whichincludemarketingfunds,loyaltyprograms,andotherservices/

valueprovidedbythebrandedsystem.Therefore,theliftinyieldwouldhavetobemorethan

commensuratewiththeincrementalcost.Accordingtoourcalculations,Franchisingdealswouldbe

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verybeneficialtotheC-corps,withMAR,HLT,orHseeingover$500MinfeesfromevenVIK,andupto

$1.85BinfeesfromCCL,representinganywherefroma10%uplifttoamorethandoublingofcurrent

feescollected.Forthecruiselines,thisaddedfeeexpenseiswellworthitunderourassumptions,as

webelievethatthecruiselineswouldnotonlyreplaceaportionofitsexpensivetravelagentbookings,

butwouldalsoseeamodestoccupancyboostfromfullaccesstoaC-Corployaltyprogram,with

anaverageADRupliftof~10%aswell.Weexplorethefullmathbehindourassumptionsonaffiliate

andfranchisingbenefitinsubsequentportionsofthisreport.

Chart8-ProposingtheFranchise&AffiliationAgreementFramework

NoHotelPartnership

BaseCase

FranchiseAgreement

AffiliationAgreement

LoyaltyChannel

AllOthers(BaseCase)

Total

Rooms

1,000

1,000

1,000

Occupancy

70.0%

72.5%

7.5%

62.5%

70.0%

ADR

100.00

110.00

105.00

100.00

100.54

RevPAR($)

70.00

79.75

7.88

62.50

70.38

AnnualRoomNights

255,500

264,625

27,375

228,125

255,500

GrossRoomRevenue($M)

25.6

29.1

2.9

22.8

25.7

F&B&Others%ofGRR

15%

15%

15%

15%

15%

F&B&OthersRevenues($M)

3.8

4.4

0.4

3.4

3.9

TotalRevenues

29.4

33.5

3.3

26.2

29.5

Assumptions:

HotelLoyaltyADRLift

10.0%

5.0%

HotelLoyaltyOccupancyLift

10.0%

7.5%

Cannibalization

7.5%

7.5%

HotelLoyaltyNetOccupancyLift

2.5%

0.0%

HotelLoyalyOccupancyMix

11%

RestofChannelMix

89%

Source:JefferiesEstimates

Chart9-Franchise&AffiliateAgreementFeeStructure

FranchiseAgreement

AffiliationAgreement

RoyalyRate5.0%

F&BRoyaltyRate3.0%

MarketingPlatformFeesRate3.0%

RoyalFees1.5

F&BRoyaltyFees0.1

TotalRoyaltyFees1.6

MarketingPlatformFees0.9

TotalFeesDue2.5

IncrementalRevenue4.1

NetImpactonOperatingIncome1.6

AffiliationFees7.5%

IncentiveAffiliationFees3.8%

IncentiveAffiliationThreshold(Occ.)5.0%

MarketingPlatformFeesRate2.5%

AffiliationFees0.03

IncentiveAffiliationFees-

TotalRoyaltyFees0.03

MarketingPlatformFees0.07

TotalFeesDue0.10

IncrementalRevenue0.16

NetImpactonOperatingIncome0.05

ROI166%

ROI151%

Source:JefferiesEstimates

Chart10-NUGGrowthFromCruiseSurpassesMostOtherOptions

NUGGrowth

CCL

RCL

NCLH

VIK

MAR

25%

17%

7%

2%

HLT

21%

14%

6%

2%

H

78%

52%

21%

8%

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

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Chart11-C-CorpsWouldSeeSignificantIncreasesinFeeRevenueFromaDealWithCruiseOperators

C-CorpEst.FeesfromCruises($M)

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

$129.0

$1,856.1

RCL

$91.0

$1,318.2

NCLH

$52.7

$728.0

VIK

$49.1

$543.6

Est.MARFeeUpliftas%ofCurrentFees

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

2%

36%

RCL

2%

25%

NCLH

1%

14%

VIK

1%

11%

Est.HLTFeeUpliftas%ofCurrentFees

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

4%

57%

RCL

3%

40%

NCLH

2%

22%

VIK

2%

17%

Est.HFeeUpliftas%ofCurrentFees

AffiliateDeal

FranchiseDeal

CCL

12%

169%

RCL

8%

120%

NCLH

5%

66%

VIK

4%

49%

Source:CompanyData,JefferiesEstimates

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BoostingCruiseRevPARThroughPartnershipsWithC-

CorpLoyaltyPrograms

Weexaminedthecruiseoperators'oft-repeatedmantrathatcruisevacationsrepresenta25%to

40%bettervaluethanacomparableland-basedalternative,andfoundthistobelargelytrue.More

specifically,welookedatthecruiseoperators'variousbrands,andappliedanestimateofwhat

chainscaleSTRwouldassignwerethebrandtobeahotel.Then,wecalculatedtheRevPAReach

cruiseoperatorwasseeing(i.e.,ticketrevenue/berths)andcomparedittotheimpliedRevPAReach

operatorwouldseeifitsrespectivebrandswereachievingtheSTRaverageRevPARappropriatefor

itschainscale.Theresultsconfirmedthecruiseoperators'claims-theSTRimpliedRevPARwas

27%to37%higherthantheactualRevPARachievedbythecruiselines.Importantly,wenotethat

ouranalysisdidnotattempttoquantifytheaddedbenefitthatthecruisesprovideintheformof

largelyall-inclusivefoodandsoft-drinks,comparedtotheC-corpspurelodgingoffering(ormaybe

breakfast),whichimpliesthatthefullvaluepremiumcruisesofferislikelyevenmoresubstantial

thanourestimated27%to37%.

Asasanity-check,weperformedthesameSTR-weightedRevPARexerciseonMARandHLT,and

foundthatMARandHLTsawUSRevPARroughlyin-linewithwhatSTRwouldimply.Therefore,we

believethisdisparityalludestoasignificantopportunityforthecruises,weretheytopartnerwith

MARorHLTonanaffiliateorfranchisebasis.

Chart12-JEFEstimatedCruiseOperatorBerthsbySTRComparableChainScale

Source:CompanyData,STR,JefferiesEstimates

Chart14-CruiseOperatorsSeeRevPARFarBelowWhatSTRWouldImply

DiffinFY24ARevPARvs.STRImpliedRevPAR

5%

0%

(5%)

(10%)

(15%)

(20%)

(25%)

(30%)

(35%)

(40%)

1%

(0%)

(27%)

(30%)

(34%)

(37%)

CCLRCLVIKMARHLT

Source:CompanyData,STR,JefferiesEstimates

1)Hexcludedduetocomparibilityissues.

Chart13-JEFEstimatedMAR&HLTRoomsbySTRComparableChainScale

Source:CompanyData,STR,JefferiesEstimates

1)Hexcludedduetocomparibilityissues.

Chart15-C-CorpLoyaltyWouldLikelyImproveCruiseEffectiveRevPAR

FY24ASystemRevPAR(Est.forCruise)

$300

CompanyChain-ScaleWeightedEst.RevPARSTRImpliedRevPARbyChain-ScaleWeighting

$250

$261

$200

$190

$150

$134

$132

$139

$122

$121

$100

$97

$87

$88

$50

$61$64

$0

CCLRCLVIKMARHLT

Source:CompanyData,STR,JefferiesEstimates

1)Hexcludedduetocomparibilityissues.

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HigherRevPAR=HigherRevenue,SometimesaLot

Higher

WelookedatpotentialcruiseoperatorpartnershipswiththeC-corpsoneitheranaffiliateorfranchise

basis,anddeterminedthatbothoptionsareapositiveforcruiseoperatorrevenue.However,based

ontheassumptionsweused(below),thefranchisedealscreensfarmoreattractively,asweestimate

thatthecruiseswouldseeonaveragea10%ADRliftonafranchisedeal,vs.a5%liftonanaffiliate

deal.Additionally,weassumedthatthefranchisedealwouldleadtoaslight2.5ptincreasein

occupancyinadditiontotheADRlift,asthecruiseswouldhaveamuchlargerfunneltosourcelast-

minuteguestsfromtofillitinerariesthatwentevenslightlyun-booked.

Furthermore,webelievethatinbothinstances,thebookingsfromanaffiliateorfranchisedealwould

likelypartiallyreplacethecruiseoperators'mostexpensivechannel-travelagents.Asshowninchart

19,weestimatethatbetween5%and35%oftotalFY24bookingscamefromtravelagents,with

NCLHlikelyseeingthelargestshareandRCLthesmallestshare.Giventhesebookingsarelikely

comingatcommissionratesbetween10%to15%,webelievethatthereisapotentialcost-cutting

opportunity(inadditiontothelargerrevenueopportunity)forthecruiseoperatorsfromapartnership

withtheC-corps.

Tothisend,inanaffiliatedealscenario,weassumethatthecruiseoperatorswillsee~7.5%oftotal

bookingscomefromtheaffiliatedeal,withallofthesebookingsreplacinganequivalentamountof

travelagentbookings.Forafranchisedeal,weassumethatthesame~7.5%ofbookingsfromtravel

agentswilldisappear,butthatthecruiseoperatorswillseeahealthier~10%ofbookingsfromthe

franchisedeal,leadingtoanetoccupancyimprovementof~2.5pts.

Fortheaffiliatedealfeestructure,weassumedthatthecruiseoperatorswouldpaytotheC-corps

a7.5%affiliationfee,anda2.5%marketingplatformfee,bothonthegrossroomrevenuegenerated

fromaffiliatebookings.Inourcalculations,wealsoassumedthatthecruiseoperatorswouldpay

a3.75%incentiveaffiliationfeeonbookingsaboveanet5ptincreaseinoccupancy,thoughthis

wasnottriggered,givenourassumptionthataffiliatebookingswouldactasareplacementtotravel

agents,ratherthanfullincrementalbookings.

Forthefranchisedealfeestructure,weassumedthatthecruiseoperatorswouldpaytotheC-corps