Reasonsandcountermeasuresoflistedcompanies'financialfraudPickto:financialfraudaccompaniedbyChina'sreformandopeningprocessandcontinuousdevelopment,bringsocialharmismoreandmoreapparent,whethertofinancialfraudeffectivemanagementbythepeople'swidespreadconcern.Onthelistedcompany'sfinancialfraudconceptsandmethodsweresummarized,fromtheinterestdrive,corporategovernance,accountingpersonneloccupationmoralstandards,accountingandauditingsystem,in-depthanalysisofthecausesoffinancialfraud,andinviewoftheabovereasonsputforwardthecorrespondingcontrolmeasuresKeywords:financialfraud;reasons;controlcountermeasures;listedcompanyIntroductionSincethebeginningofEnroninlate2001,casesoffinancialfraudinlistedcompaniesathomeandabroadfrequentlyburstout.Inearly2006,theShanghainationalaccountingInstituteResearchCenterforfinancialfraud(snaiFFRC)disclosedto"kelong"headedbythe"2005toptenmostfraudulentfinancialcompaniesofthelistedcompanies"meansismoreamazingthefinancialfraudof"smart".Self,circulatingtrading,tradingofyinandYang,thepackingchannels,alwaysaccountingerrors,largebath,mergersandacquisitions,restructuring,concealedstocks,thereportcashtraps,thisisatoptenlistingcompaniesfinancialfraudtrick.One,theconceptoffinancialfraudandwayFinancialfraudisthesubjectoffalsefinancialinformationprocessinginaccountingandreportingprocess,toobtainundueeconomicinterests,useddeceptivemeanstointentionallyliedabouttheimportanceandfinancialfactsofviolationsoflawsandsubstantiveviolations.Financialfraudhasfourcharacteristics:unlawful,intentionalsexuality,danger,andconcealment.Specificmeansoffinancialfraudcanbesaidtobeendless,butthecoreisintact.Incomefraudincludingfictitiousearningsandrevenueacrossperiods;costoffraudincludingcross-phasemetercostlessandadjustmentcostsaswellascostsofcapital;corruptcashfraud,shouldbetheprojectassets,suchasfraud,lessprovisionforimpairment;liabilitiesaregenerallyless-totalliabilitiesoffraud.Financialfraudmeansbasicallyhasthefollowingseveralaspects:theuseofimproperaccountingpoliciesandaccountingfraud.Managementtypicallyuseintertemporalamortizationclassaccountsformanyshare,sharemore,lessorlesscosttoadjustprofit.(1)theselectionofinappropriateborrowingcostsaccountingmethod.Inpractice,manylistedcompanythroughmisuseofborrowingcostsaccounting,inbuildaprojectcompletedandnotthefinal.(2)improperselectionofequityinvestmentaccountingmethods.Principlesofenterpriseaccountingregulations:investmententerprisesofjointcontrolorsignificantinfluence,shouldadoptequitymethod;instead,itusesthecostmethod.Butmanycompaniesuse,whentheinvesteecompanyprofit,shouldnotusetheequitymethodinvestmentusingtheequitymethodofaccounting;whentheinvesteecompanyloss,theequitymethodtothecostmethod.(3)improperselectionofmergingpolicy.(4)theimproperselectionofdepreciationmethod.Extendeddepreciation,byacceleratingmethodischangedintothestraightlinemethod,in

practiceitisoftenseen.(5)theimproperselectionofincome,costconfirmationmethod.Advanceordelaytheconfirmationofincomeorexpenseisalsolistedcompaniesgenerallyadoptcheating.(6)theimproperselectionoftheimpairmentprovisionmethod.useofenterpriseinternalcontrolsystemdefectsandtheweaklinkoffraud.Asthecashierpersonneluseenterpriseblankcheck,financialdedicatedseal,legalpersonsealdoesnotseparatekeepingmalpractice,privatelyissuedchecks,misappropriationofpublicfunds.Cozywithhisdutiesincompatiblestaffcolludewithafraud.relatedpartytransactionfraud.Therelatedpartytransactionfraud,referstothemanagementusingtherelatedpartytransactiontohidelosses,fictitiousprofits,andnotinthestatementsandnotesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsasappropriate,fulldisclosure,theresultinginformationwillhaveontheusersoffinancialstatementsmisleadingafraudmethod.Typically,Chineselistedcompaniesusingthepurchaseandsaleofrelatedfraud,fraud,entrustedwiththeoperationoffundsembezzlement,fraudandotherfourkindsofcostsharingrelatedtransactionsbywayoffictitiousprofit.theassetsoffraud.Assetrestructuring,mergersandacquisitions,debtrestructuring,assetreplacementform,occurringbetweentherelatedparties.Assetsreorganizationofcorruptcorruptcorruptmajormergersandacquisitionsanddebtrestructuringintwoways.coverupfraudtransactionorfact.Hidetransactionorfactoffraudisthroughtheuseofaccountingstatementstohidetransactionsoflistedcompaniesorthetruth,orhasnotbeenfullydisclosedinthenotestothereportdealstruthanfraudmethods.Second,thecausesoflistedcompanies'financialmalpracticeListedcompanies'financialmalpracticecausedseveralofthefollowingreasons:financialreturnfargreaterthanthecostoffraud.Tomeetlistingstandardsatsomecompaniesdesperatetofindwaystomakefinancialfraud,andfraud,tomeetthepolicyrequirements.Inaddition,becausethesharepriceistimestheincomeandearningspershare,andhighstockmarketprice/earningsratioofdeformityinChina,sothemainpurposeoflistedcompany'sfinancialfraudisfalseprofits.Falseprofitsof$1,thecirculationmarketvalueoflistedcompanieswillincrease10timestimestimes.Relativetothefraudfraudincome,costistoolow,fromacertainextent,itistoolowafraudcostcontributedsomefraud.corporategovernancestructureisnotperfect.Corporategovernancestructureisinfactaboutbetweenowners,theBoardofDirectorsandseniorexecutiveofficersrightsassignedandthearrangementofasystemofchecksandbalances,therealityinChina,leddirectlytotheequitystructureoflistedcompaniesmalformationsincludethegeneralmeetingofshareholders,BoardofDirectors,Boardofsupervisors,whichdistorttherelationshipbetweencorporategovernancestructureofchecksandbalances,whichhasprovidedanopportunityforfinancialfraudinlistedcompanies.Thisismainlymanifestedinthefollowingaspects:(1)theownershipstructureisnotreasonable.Asofthesecondhalfof2006,theShanghaiandShenzhenstockmarket,sharesofover

50listedcompaniesonly185,largestshareholderholdingratioofnomorethan25andonly219,60?70listedcompanieshaveinvadedandoccupiedbylargeshareholdersoflistedcompany'sfunds.Inthecaseofhighconcentrationofownership,possibilitiesoftreatmentfailureoflistedcompaniesincreased,listedcompanies,thegreaterpossibilityoffinancialfraud.(2)theindependenceoftheBoardisnotstrong,internalcontrolisaseriousproblem.ChinalistedcompanyDirectorservedasSeniorManagerofthephenomenonismoreprevalent,DirectorservesastheSeniorManager(internalcontrol)morethan50percentofthesamplecompany32,morethan30percentofasampleof65companies.Inthiscase,theoperationoftheBoardisusually"Insider"orshareholdercontrol,ratherthanbasedonthecollectiveinterest.Thishasledtothephenomenonoffrequentcorporatefinancialfraud.(3)theSupervisoryBoardweakeningtheoversightfunction,financialreportdifficultyindischargingitsoversightfunctions.Basedonanalysisoflistedcompanyfinancialreportingfraud,BoardofsupervisorssysteminsuppressionoffinancialfraudinChinadidnotplayaroleofDirectorsandmanagersofmonitoring.Listedcompaniesarerequiredbylawtosetupasupervisoryboard,Boardofsupervisorsactuallyareinaveryawkwardposition,lowerrightorupperrightofvulnerablerightsofsupervisionorstrongerright.accountingstafflackofprofessionalethics.Financeandaccountingpersonnelwhoaredirectlyinvolvedinfinancialfraud,fromthemacroperspective,ismainlylongtermandnotenoughonaccountingethicseducation,lackofaccountingprofessionalstandards;micro-perspective,strongsenseofcompanyaccountantslaw,inordertomeetcompanyleadersofunhealthypsychological,thusviolatingtheethicsofbeingpracticalandrealistic,objectiveandfair.Inaddition,individualsdrivenbyeconomicinterests,hasalsoledtosomeaccountantsdeliberatelyforged,altered,hidinganddestroyedtheaccountinginformation,takingadvantageofhispositionoffinancialfraud.accountingandauditsystemisnotsound.Inrecentyears,althoughChinaismakingalotofaccountingandauditinglegislation,butfromthepracticalpointofviewarenotperfectandsound.Pooroperabilityofsomeprovisions,resultinginaccountingfraudanopportunity.Newaccountinglaw"legalresponsibility"chapterreferredto"serious","criminal","significantlosses"arenotquantified,hasnospecificexplanation.2006implementationofnewaccountingstandards,providedmoreaccountingoptionsformanagement,whichprovidesmanagementwithmoreprofitopportunities.Inaddition,lackofpunishmentmeasures,socialsupervisionisnotstrong,qualityperformanceevaluationofaccountingdoesnotwork,noabilitytodetectfraud,alsocanleadtooccurrenceoflistedcompanies'financialmalpractice.Third,thegovernanceoflistedcompanies'financialfraudcountermeasurescoordinatingtherelationshipbetweenbenefitsandcostsoffinancialfraud.Weshouldincreasethepenaltiesforfinancialfraud,financialfraudcostsmorethanitgains,soyoucanbasicallystopfinancialfraud.Atthesametime,inchargeoffinancialmalpracticeshouldbearunlimitedjointandseveralfinancialresponsibility,whichcantoalargeextent,inhibittheirimpulsesofillegalcounterfeiting.Forthosewhodaretoreporttheaccountingofficershallprovideamplerewards,sothatitsbehaviorisgreaterthanthelossofincometoreportfinancialfraud.Inthisway,financialmalpracticeliabilityandtheywilltaketheinitiativetogiveuptheideaoffinancialfraud.perfectthecorporategovernancestructure.Improvetheinternalgovernancestructureofthe

company,istopreventfinancialfraud,improvethequalityofaccountinginformation.(1)toimprovethecompany'sownershipstructure,cansolvethestatusofminorityshareholdersandthecontrollingshareholderisnotsymmetric.(2)theperfectionoflistedcompany'sBoard.IntheestablishmentofexternalindependentdirectorsontheBoardofthecompany,andprovidesthatacertainproportionoftheexternalindependentdirectors,andestablishedanumberofspecializedcommittees,raisethelevelofprofessionalizationoftheBoard,toplaytheroleoftheBoard.(3)improvementBoardofsupervisorsoflistedcompanies.AstheBoardofsupervisorsamereformality,onlytostandinthegovernancestructureofthecompany,tofurtherimprovethesystemofBoardofsupervisors.raisingthelevelofprofessionalethicsofaccountants.Statemanagementandaccountingdepartments,shouldcontinuouslystrengthentheideologicaleducationofaccountantsandaccountingstafflevelscontinuetoimprove,makingitabletoconsciouslyresistfinancialmalpractice,graduallyestablishingaccountingintegrityandfairimage.accountingandauditingsystems.Accountingstandardsandtheflexibilityofthesystemistheimportantbasisforfinancialfraudtoachieve.Firstofall,accordingtoChina'sactualconditions,principlesofsystemofaccountingstandardsandmakeappropriateadjustments,ingenerallackofethicalcultureinChinanow,improvingthereliabilityoftheaccountingreportisthekey.Second,correctlyhandletherelationshipbetweenconsistencyandflexibility,reducingtheoptionsavailabletothecompanywithinthescopeofaccountingsystemasmuchaspossible,especiallywhenitcomestoincomeandexpensesrecognizedmeasuringprinciple,thedepreciationoffixedassets,eight-assetimpairmentprovisionratioandmaximumdetailedprovisionsshouldbemade.Introducespecificimplementationdetailswillbequantitativeandspecificlegalresponsibilitytoexplain,thishastheadvantageofpartiesaclearfinancialconsequencesoffraud,alsoinfavouroftherelevantdepartmentstodeterminethefinancialfraudandpunishablebyappropriatepenalties.Finally,givefullplaytotheroleofpublicopinionandthemedia.Astheperfectionofthesecuritiesmarket,marketsupervisionisnotlimitedtocertifiedpublicaccountantsandtheGovernment,thegeneralpublicandthemediahasalsobeeninvolvedintheregulatoryprocess.TheendAtpresent,Chinaisinanearlystageofmarketeconomy,allkindsofdeceptivebehaviorsemerge,accountingactivityasameasureofeconomicactivity,inevitablyfinancialfraud.Financialfraudisnotonlyaneconomicphenomenon,isalsoavisualizationofthedeepmoralconviction.So,onthegovernanceoffinancialfraudisasystemsengineering,business,communityandgovernmentsupervisionofTrinitysystemisrequiredinalldepartmentsandmakeconcertedefforts,coordinatewitheachother.Onlyanintegratedapproachtogovernance,tocreategoodinformationenvironmentforChina'seconomicdevelopment.Reference.HouYanlei,ZhaiYingmin.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompaniesanalysis[J].Economyandmanagement,2006,(7):71-73.

HuangXinjian.Chineselistedcompany'sfinancialfraudandtheCountermeasuresResearch[J].Economicsurvey,2006,(4):77-79.WangJianxin.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompanies:motivesandmanagement[J].Marketmodernization,2008,(2):346-347.YangYunshu.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompaniesanalysis[J].Accountingresearch,2006,:62-63.YouXiaofeng.ChineseResearchonfinancialgovernanceofListedCompanies[M].Beijing:EconomicSciencePress,2005:144-145.ZhangAimin.Thecombinationofinternalandexternal,preventionoffinancialfraudofListedCompanies[J].Contemporaryeconomy,2006,(2):18-19.HongGe.Fraudinfinancialreportsoflistedcompaniesgovernanceapproach[J].Economicreview,2005,(9):117-137.WangHaixia.Internalgovernancestructureinlistedcompaniesandthepreventionoffinancialfraud[J].Auditing&Finance,2005,(7):23-24.上市公司財務(wù)舞弊原因及對策摘要：財務(wù)舞弊行為伴隨著中國改革開放的進程而不斷演進發(fā)展，帶給社會的危害也愈來愈明顯，能否對財務(wù)舞弊行為進行切實有效地治理受到人們的普遍關(guān)注。對上市公司財務(wù)舞弊行為的概念和方式進行了歸納，從利益驅(qū)動、公司治理機制、財會人員職業(yè)道德水平、會計和審計制度等方面深入分析財務(wù)舞弊的成因，并且針對以上成因提出了相應(yīng)的治理措施。關(guān)鍵詞：財務(wù)舞弊；原因；治理對策；上市公司引言2001年末的安然事件以來，國內(nèi)外上市公司財務(wù)舞弊案件頻繁爆出。2006年初，上海國家會計學(xué)院財務(wù)舞弊研究中心（snaiFFRC）披露的以“科龍電器”為首的伐005年度上市公司十大財務(wù)舞弊公司排行榜”則更加讓人驚嘆其財務(wù)舞弊手段之“高明”。自我交易、循環(huán)交易、陰陽交易、填塞渠道、不斷并購、會計差錯、大洗澡、報表重組、隱瞞炒股、現(xiàn)金陷阱此乃上市公司財務(wù)舞弊十大絕招。一、財務(wù)舞弊的概念及方式財務(wù)舞弊是財務(wù)造假主體在會計信息加工處理和報告過程中，為獲取不正當?shù)慕?jīng)濟利益，采用欺騙性手段故意謊報重要性和實質(zhì)性財務(wù)事實的違法、違紀行為。財務(wù)舞弊具有四個方面的特點：違法性、有意性、危害性和隱蔽性。財務(wù)舞弊的具體手段可以說是層出不窮，但核心是不變的。其中收入舞弊包括虛構(gòu)收入和跨期調(diào)整收入；費用舞弊包括少計費用、跨期調(diào)整費用以及濫用費用資本化；資產(chǎn)舞弊有現(xiàn)金舞弊、應(yīng)收項目舞弊、少提減值準備等；負債舞弊一般是少計負債。財務(wù)舞弊的方式主要有以下幾個方面：利用不當?shù)臅嬚吆蜁嫻烙嬑璞?。管理當局通常利用跨期攤提類會計科目進行多攤、少攤或多提、少提費用以調(diào)節(jié)利潤。（1）選用不當?shù)慕杩钯M用核算方法。在實際工作中，不少上市公司通過濫用借款費用的會計處理，在建工程完工而不進行竣工決算。（2）選用不當?shù)墓蓹?quán)投資核算方法。企業(yè)會計準則中規(guī)定：投資企業(yè)具有共同控制或重大影響時，應(yīng)采用權(quán)益法；反之，則采用成本法。但很多公司運用時，當被投資公司盈利時，不該用權(quán)益法的投資也用權(quán)益法核算；當被投資公司虧損時，該用權(quán)益法的又改成成本法核算。（3）選用不當?shù)暮喜⒄?。?）選用不當?shù)恼叟f方法。延長折舊年限、由加速法改為直線法等情況在實際操作中屢見不鮮。（5）選用不當?shù)氖杖?、費用確認方法。提前或推遲確認收入或費用也是上市公司普遍采用的舞弊方法。（6）選用不當?shù)臏p值準備計提方法。利用企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制制度的缺陷和薄弱環(huán)節(jié)進行舞弊。如出納人員利用企業(yè)空白支票、財務(wù)專用章、法人印鑒未予分離保管的弊端、私自開具支票、挪用公款等。拉攏與自己職責(zé)不相容的人員串通舞弊等。3.關(guān)聯(lián)方交易舞弊。所謂關(guān)聯(lián)方交易舞弊，是指管理當局利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易掩飾虧損，虛構(gòu)利潤，并且未在報表及附注中按規(guī)定做恰當、充分的披露，由此生成的信息將會對報表使用者產(chǎn)生誤導(dǎo)的一種舞弊方法。通常，中國上市公司采用關(guān)聯(lián)購銷舞弊、受托經(jīng)營舞弊、資金往來舞弊、費用分擔舞弊等四種關(guān)聯(lián)交易舞弊方式來虛構(gòu)利潤。4.資產(chǎn)重組舞弊。資產(chǎn)重組有資產(chǎn)置換、并購、債務(wù)重組等形式，多發(fā)生在關(guān)聯(lián)方之間。資產(chǎn)重組舞弊主要有并購舞弊和債務(wù)重組舞弊兩種。5.掩飾交易或事實舞弊。掩飾交易或事實舞弊是指上市公司通過利用會計報表項目掩飾交易或事實真相，或者在報表附注中未能完全披露交易真相的一種欺詐方法。二、上市公司財務(wù)舞弊行為產(chǎn)生的原因造成上市公司財務(wù)舞弊行為有以下幾方面原因：財務(wù)舞弊的收益遠遠大于成本一些公司為了達到股票上市標準不惜鋌而走險想方設(shè)法、弄虛作假進行財務(wù)舞弊，以達到政策要求。此外，由于股價是每股收益與市盈率的乘積，而中國證券市場的市盈率畸形偏高，所以上市公司財務(wù)舞弊的主要目的就是虛增利潤。每虛增1元的利潤，上市公司的流通市值便會10倍甚至百倍的增加。相對于舞弊的收益而言，舞弊的成本顯然太低，從一定程度來講，正是過低的舞弊成本助長了一些舞弊的發(fā)生。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)實際上就是有關(guān)所有者、董事會和高級執(zhí)行人員三者之間權(quán)利分配和制衡關(guān)系的一種制度安排，在中國的現(xiàn)實情況下，上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的畸形直接導(dǎo)致了包括股東大會、董事會、監(jiān)事會在內(nèi)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)相互制衡關(guān)系的扭曲，這為上市公司進行財務(wù)舞弊提供了契機。這主要表現(xiàn)在以下幾個方面：（1）股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理。截至2006年下半年，滬深股市，流通股比例超過50%的上市公司只有185家，第一大股東控股比例沒有超過25%的只有219家，60%~70%的上市公司都存在著大股東侵占上市公司款項的情況。在所有權(quán)高度集中的情況下，上市公司治理失效的可能性隨之增大，上市公司財務(wù)舞弊的可能性也就越大。（2）董事會的獨立性不強，內(nèi)部人控制問題相當嚴重。中國上市公司董事兼任高級經(jīng)理的現(xiàn)象比較普遍，董事兼任高級經(jīng)理的比例（內(nèi)部人控制度）超過了50%的占樣本公司的32%，超過30%的占樣本公司的65%。在這種情況下，公司董事會的運作通常被“內(nèi)部人”或股東控制，而不是以集體利益為基礎(chǔ)的。這種現(xiàn)象的出現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致公司財務(wù)舞弊現(xiàn)象時有發(fā)生。（3）監(jiān)事會監(jiān)督功能弱化，對財務(wù)報告難以履行監(jiān)督職能。根據(jù)對發(fā)生財務(wù)報告舞弊上市公司的分析可知，中國的監(jiān)事會制度在抑制財務(wù)舞弊方面沒有發(fā)揮對董事和經(jīng)理層監(jiān)控應(yīng)有的作用。上市公司雖然按法律規(guī)定設(shè)置了監(jiān)事會，但監(jiān)事會實際處于一種十分尷尬的地位，即下位權(quán)利或弱勢權(quán)利監(jiān)督上位權(quán)利或強勢權(quán)利。2.財會人員缺乏職業(yè)道德財會人員是財務(wù)舞弊的直接參與者，從宏觀方面講，主要是長期不夠重視會計職業(yè)道德教育，沒有制定會計職業(yè)準則；從微觀方面講，公司財會人員的法律意識不強，為了迎合公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的不良心理，從而違反了實事求是、客觀公正的道德規(guī)范。另外，個人受經(jīng)濟利益的驅(qū)使，也導(dǎo)致部分財會人