GAO-23-105853

UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice

ReporttoCongressionalRequesters

August2023

NATIONALTRANSPORTATIONSAFETYBOARD

AdditionalActions

NeededtoImproveManagementandOperations

UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice

August2023

NATIONALTRANSPORTATIONSAFETYBOARD

AdditionalActionsNeededtoImproveManagement

andOperations

WhatGAOFound

TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard’s(NTSB)mostrecentstrategicplan,annualperformanceplan,andannualperformancereportfullymet14ofthe25statutorycontentrequirementsthatGAOanalyzedspecifiedinfederallawsonagencyperformanceplanning.Forexample,NTSB’sstrategicplandescribedtheagency’smissionandidentifiedexternalfactorsthatcouldaffectachievementoftheagency’sgoals.OtherrequirementsthatNTSBdidnotsatisfyarefundamentaltoolsinfederalperformancemanagement.Forexample,withinitsstrategicplan,NTSBestablishedstrategicgoalstargetingorganizationalefficiency,processimprovements,andpreparednessforemergingtechnologies.However,noneofthesestrategicgoalsdirectlylinktoNTSB’smissionofimprovingtransportationsafety,asrequired.Withoutmission-focusedstrategicgoals,itwillbedifficultforNTSBtodeterminehowtheagency’sactionsconnecttothebroaderoutcomesithopestoachieve.Byfullymeetingthisandallotherstatutorycontentrequirementsforperformanceplanningdocuments,NTSBcanbetterensureaccountabilitytoCongressandthepublic.

SummaryofExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB)Met25StatutoryContentRequirementsforItsPerformancePlanningDocuments

●●●●?○

Performanceplanningdocument

SummaryofextenttowhichNTSBmetcontentrequirements

Strategicplan●●??○○○

Annualperformanceplan●●●●●●●●???○

Annualperformancereport

Legend:EachdotrepresentsonestatutoryrequirementthatGAOassessed.●=Met;?=Partiallymet;○=Notmet

Source:GAOanalysisofNTSBinformation.|GAO-23-105853NTSBhasimproveditsuseofinvestigationdatatoinformdecisions,butithasmadelimitedprogressindoingsoforlaborcostdata(i.e.,dataonstafftimespentonindividualinvestigationsandotheractivities).NTSBhaspreviouslytakenstepstoimprovetheusabilityofitslaborcostdatabut,despiteyearsofeffort,continuestobeunabletousethesedataforresourceallocationandotherdecision-making.NTSBofficialssaidthattheyrecentlyimprovedNTSB’slaborcostdatasystem,andthattheyexpecttoreceiveapprovaltofullyimplementtheupdatedsystemlaterthisyear.Untilthen,NTSBislimitedinitsabilitytouselaborcostdatatomakemoreinformeddecisions,inalignmentwithfederalguidancethatdirectsagenciestoleveragedataincarryingouttheirmissions.NTSBhasrecentlytakenstepstodeterminewhetheritsworkforcehastheskillsneededtocarryouttheagency’smission.However,theseeffortsdonotprovidecomprehensiveinformationontheskillsstaffneed,howmanystaffhavethoseskills,andwhereskillgapsexist.In2022,NTSBissuedasurveyandheldlisteningsessionswithstafftoidentifytrainingneeds,buttheseeffortsdidnotincludeallmission-criticalstaff,asleadingpracticesrecommend,nordidtheyidentifytherangeofskillsneeded.Moreover,NTSBofficialsindicatedthattheydonothaveaconsolidatedinventoryofcurrentstaffskills.Asaresultoftheseshortcomings,NTSBishamperedinitsabilitytoidentifyskillgapsacrosstheagency,includinginallmission-criticaloccupations,andtoimplementstrategiestoaddressitsmostpressingneeds.

Highlightsof

GAO-23-105853

,areporttocongressionalrequesters

WhyGAODidThisStudy

NTSBplaysavitalroleinadvancingtransportationsafetybyinvestigatingandreportingontheprobablecauseofaccidentsandissuingsafetyrecommendations.Despitegrowthandtechnologicaladvancementinthetransportationsector,NTSB’sstaffinglevelshaveremainedaboutthesameforthepast20years,accordingtoNTSB.CongresshasexpressedconcernsaboutthetimelinessofNTSB’saccidentinvestigationreports,thequalityofitsaccidentinvestigationdata,andwhethertheagencyhassufficientstafftoconductitswork.

GAOwasaskedtoreviewNTSB’smanagementandoperations.Thisreportevaluates,amongotherthings,NTSB’s(1)performanceplanningefforts;(2)effortstoimproveitsuseofdataindecision-making;and(3)recentworkforceplanningactivitiestoidentifyskillgapsinitsworkforce.

GAOanalyzedNTSBreports,plans,procedures,andotherdocumentsrelatedtotheagency’smanagementandoperations;comparedNTSB’seffortswithrelevantlawsandguidance;reviewedNTSBinvestigationandcontractingdata;andinterviewedagencyofficials.

WhatGAORecommends

GAOismakingsixrecommendations,includingthatNTSBensureitsfutureperformanceplanningdocumentsmeetallstatutoryrequirements;finalizeasystemthatenablestheagencytomoreeffectivelyanalyzeanduselaborcostdata;andconductaskillgapassessment.NTSBdidnottakeapositionontherecommendationsbutidentifiedactionstoaddressthem.

View

GAO-23-105853

.Formoreinformation,contactHeatherKrauseat(202)512-2834or

krauseh@

.

PageiGAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

Contents

Letter

Background

NTSB’sPerformancePlanningDidNotMeetAllFederalRequirements

NTSBHasFollowedFederalGuidancetoImproveItsUseofData,butHasNotCompletedItsEffortsRelatedtoDataonLabor

Costs

NTSB’sRecentWorkforcePlanningEffortsHaveNotAssessed

SkillGapsforAllMission-CriticalStaff

NTSBHasEstablishedPoliciesandProceduresThatAddressMostSelectedInformationSecurityandRiskManagementKeyPractices,butGapsRemain

Conclusions

RecommendationsforExecutiveAction

AgencyCommentsandOurEvaluation

1

5

8

14

19

21

27

28

28

AppendixI

AdditionalInformationonNationalTransportationSafetyBoardPerformancePlanningDocuments

30

AppendixII

CommentsfromtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

35

AppendixIII

GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgments

38

Tables

Table1:InformationonNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB)ModalOffices7

Table2:ExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB)MetStatutoryContentRequirementsforIts

PerformancePlanningDocuments9

Table3:ExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafety

Board’s(NTSB)PoliciesandProceduresAddress

SelectedKeyPracticesforEstablishingAgency

InformationSecurityProgramsandManaging

CybersecurityRisks23

Table4:ExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB)MetStatutoryContentRequirementsforItsFiscal

Year2022–2026StrategicPlan31

PageiiGAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

Table5:ExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB)MetStatutoryContentRequirementsforItsFiscal

Year2023AnnualPerformancePlan32

Table6:ExtenttoWhichtheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB)MetStatutoryContentRequirementsforItsFiscal

Year2022AnnualPerformanceReport34

Figures

Figure1:TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard’s(NTSB)

MissionandStrategicGoalsforFiscalYears2022–202611

Figure2:TimelineofActionstoImprovetheUseofLaborCost

DataattheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB),

2000–202217

PageiiiGAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

Abbreviations

AODR

AuthorizingOfficialDesignatedRepresentative

CIO

ChiefInformationOfficer

CISO

ChiefInformationSecurityOfficer

CSIRC

ComputerSecurityIncidentResponseCapability

EvidenceAct

FoundationsforEvidence-BasedPolicymakingActof2018

FISMA2002

FederalInformationSecurityManagementActof

2002

FISMA2014

FederalInformationSecurityModernizationActof

2014

IT

informationtechnology

GPRA

GovernmentPerformanceandResultsActof1993

GPRAMA

GPRAModernizationActof2010

NIST

NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology

NTSB

NationalTransportationSafetyBoard

OMB

OfficeofManagementandBudget

OPM

OfficeofPersonnelManagement

SAFTI

SystemforAnalysisofFederalTransportationInvestigations

SORN

systemofrecordsnotice

SP

specialpublication

ThisisaworkoftheU.S.governmentandisnotsubjecttocopyrightprotectionintheUnitedStates.ThepublishedproductmaybereproducedanddistributedinitsentiretywithoutfurtherpermissionfromGAO.However,becausethisworkmaycontaincopyrightedimagesorothermaterial,permissionfromthecopyrightholdermaybenecessaryifyouwishtoreproducethismaterialseparately.

Page1GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

Letter

441GSt.N.W.

Washington,DC20548

August17,2023

TheHonorableSamGraves

Chairman

CommitteeonTransportationandInfrastructure

HouseofRepresentatives

TheHonorableGarretGraves

Chairman

SubcommitteeonAviation

CommitteeonTransportationandInfrastructure

HouseofRepresentatives

TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB)playsavitalroleinadvancingtransportationsafetybyinvestigatinganddeterminingtheprobablecauseofselectedaccidents,issuingsafetyrecommendations,andadvocatingforsafetyimprovements.AccordingtoNTSB,theagencyhasconductedinvestigationsofmorethan153,000aviationaccidentsandthousandsofsurfacetransportationaccidents.Fromthoseinvestigations,NTSBhasissuedmorethan15,300safetyrecommendations.Theagency’sstaffinglevels,accordingtoNTSB,haveremainedaboutthesameastheywere20yearsago,withabout400employees.Yetthetransportationsectorhasexperiencedtremendousgrowthandtechnologicaladvancement,strainingNTSB’sabilitytokeeppace.

CongressiscurrentlyconsideringNTSB’sreauthorization,whichwillsetagencyprioritiesforthecomingyears.Further,CongresshasexpressedconcernsaboutNTSB’soperations,includingthetimelinessofitsaccidentinvestigationreports,thequalityofitsaccidentinvestigationdata,andwhetherNTSBhassufficientstafftoconductitswork.AccordingtoNTSB,theaveragelengthoftimeforNTSBtocompleteaninvestigationincreasedfrom18.7monthsin2016to21.6monthsin2020.Givenitscriticalsafetymission,itisimportantthatNTSBprovidetimelyresultsandeffectivelyuseitslimitedresources,includingitsfiscalyear2023appropriationofabout$129million.

Page2GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

YouaskedustoreviewNTSB’smanagementandoperations.

1

Thisreportevaluatestheextenttowhich(1)NTSB’sperformanceplanningeffortsmeetfederalrequirements;(2)NTSB’seffortstoimproveitsabilitytousedatafordecision-makingalignwithfederalrequirementsandguidance;(3)NTSB’srecentworkforceplanningeffortsfollowselectedleadingpracticesforidentifyingstaffskillgaps;and(4)NTSBhasestablishedpoliciesandprocedurestoensurethesecurityofitsinformationsystemsanddata.

TodeterminetheextenttowhichNTSB’sperformanceplanningeffortsmeetfederalrequirements,wereviewedNTSB’sstrategicplanforfiscalyears2022through2026,itsfiscalyear2023annualperformanceplan(issuedinNovember2022),anditsfiscalyear2022annualperformancereport(issuedinNovember2022).Theseperformanceplanningdocumentswerethemostrecentatthetimeweperformedthisauditwork.WealsointerviewedagencyofficialsaboutNTSB’sperformanceplanningefforts.WethenassessedtheextenttowhichtheseeffortsmetfederalrequirementsforperformanceplanningfoundintheGovernmentPerformanceandResultsAct(GPRA)of1993asupdatedbytheGPRAModernizationAct(GPRAMA)of2010,

2

andinOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB)guidance.

3

ToevaluateNTSB’seffortstoimproveitsabilitytousedatafordecision-making,wereviewedNTSBdocumentsthataddresshowitusesdatatoinformmanagementdecisions.WealsoreviewedNTSBdocumentsthatdescribeitsgoalsandeffortsrelatedtogatheringdataforagencydecision-making.Inaddition,weinterviewedNTSBofficialsonthesetopics.WethenassessedtheextenttowhichNTSB’seffortsalignedwithfederalguidanceandrequirementsregardingdatause,includingGAO’sStandardsforInternalControlintheFederalGovernment,the

1WehavepreviouslyconductedreviewsofNTSB’smanagementandoperations,whichresultedinmultiplerecommendationstoimproveNTSB’soperations.NTSBhasimplementedallofourrecommendationstodate.See,forexample,GAO,NationalTransportationSafetyBoard:ManagementandOperationalImprovementsFound,butStrategyNeededtoUtilizeCostAccountingSystem,

GAO-13-611

(Washington,D.C.:July24,2013).

2Pub.L.No.103-62,107Stat.285;Pub.L.No.111-352,124Stat.3866(2011).

3OMB,Preparation,Submission,andExecutionoftheBudget,CircularNo.A-11(Washington,D.C.:Aug.15,2022).AspartofthisCircular,OMBprovidesguidanceforimplementingGPRA,GPRAMA,andotherrelatedfederalmanagementlawsandinitiatives.SeePart6,TheFederalPerformanceFrameworkforImprovingProgramandServiceDelivery.

Page3GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

FoundationsforEvidence-BasedPolicymakingActof2018(EvidenceAct),

4

theFederalDataStrategy,andtheFederalDataStrategyDataGovernancePlaybook.

5

Thisguidanceincludesleadingpracticesforagenciestobetterusedatatodeliverontheirmission,servethepublic,andstewardresources.

6

AspartofourworkevaluatingNTSB’suseofdatafordecision-making,wealsoreviewedNTSBinvestigationdatatodevelopsummarystatisticsforfiscalyears2017through2021,suchasthepercentageofinvestigationsthatwereforaviationaccidents.NTSBofficialsprovidedthesedata,whichtheyretrievedfromtheagency’sSystemforAnalysisofFederalTransportationInvestigations(SAFTI)database.WerevieweddocumentationonSAFTIandinterviewedNTSBofficialsregardingtheinvestigationdata.Wedeterminedthedataweresufficientlyreliabletoprovideahigh-leveldescriptionofNTSB’sinvestigations.

ToevaluatetheextenttowhichNTSB’srecentworkforceplanningeffortsfollowselectedleadingpracticesforidentifyingstaffskillgaps,wereviewedNTSB’sdocumentationonitscurrentactionsrelatedtoworkforceplanning,includingeffortstoidentifyandfillskillgaps.WealsointerviewedNTSBofficialstodiscusstheagency’sworkforceplanningefforts.Wereviewedkeyprinciplesandleadingpracticesforworkforce

4Pub.L.No.115-435,132Stat.5529.

5GAO,StandardsforInternalControlintheFederalGovernment,

GAO-14-704G

(Washington,D.C.:Sept.10,2014).Pub.L.No.115-435,132Stat.5529.OMB’sFederalDataStrategy,issuedin2019,includesprinciplesonhowthefederalgovernmentcanusedatatodeliveronitsmissiontobetterservethepublic.SeeOMB,MemorandumfortheHeadsofExecutiveDepartmentsandAgencies:FederalDataStrategy–AFrameworkforConsistency,M-19-18(Washington,D.C.:June4,2019).SeealsoFederalDataStrategyDataGovernancePlaybook(July2020).

6WhileNTSBiswithinthescopeofthestatutorydefinitionsofagenciesrequiredtofollowGPRA/GPRAMA,theFederalInformationSecurityModernizationAct(FISMA),andtitleIIoftheFoundationsforEvidence-BasedPolicyMakingActof2018(alsoreferredtoastheOPENGovernmentDataAct),itisnotwithinthescopeofthestatutorydefinitionsofagenciesrequiredtofollowtitleIoftheFoundationsforEvidence-BasedPolicyMakingActof2018(EvidenceAct),ortheOfficeofPersonnelManagement’s(OPM)skillgapregulation.GPRA,Pub.L.No.103-62,§§3,4(b),107Stat.285,286,288;GPRAMA,Pub.L.No.111-352,§§2,3,123Stat.3866,3867,3870(2011);FISMA2002,Pub.L.No.107-347,§301(b)(1),116Stat.2946,2947;OPENGovernmentDataAct,Pub.L.No.115-435,132Stat.5534;EvidenceAct,Pub.L.No.115-435,§101(a)(2),132Stat.5529,5530;OPMskillgapregulation,5C.F.R.§§250.204(a)(3),250.201.

Page4GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

planningidentifiedinourpriorwork.

7

WefocusedouranalysisofNTSB’sworkforceplanningeffortsontheleadingpracticeofidentifyingthegapbetweentheskillsthatagencystaffcurrentlypossessandthoseskillsneededtoaddresstheagency’smission.

8

WealsoreviewedregulationsfromtheOfficeofPersonnelManagement(OPM)onskillgapassessments.

9

AlthoughNTSBisnotrequiredtofollowthesespecificOPMregulations,theyprovideleadingpracticestoensurethatagencystaffhavethenecessaryskillstoachievetheagency’smission.

10

ToevaluateNTSB’sinformationsecuritypoliciesandprocedures,wereviewedrelevantdocumentationandinterviewedknowledgeableofficialstocorroboratethesepoliciesandprocedures.WecomparedNTSB’spoliciesandprocedureswithselectedrequirementsandleadingpracticesoninformationsecurity,includingthoseoutlinedintheFederalInformationSecurityModernizationActof2014(FISMA2014)andinOMBandNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)guidance.

11

Inselectingtherequirementsandleadingpracticesforourassessment,wefocusedonthoserequirementsandleadingpracticesrelatedtothedevelopmentofpoliciesandproceduresthataddressthe

7Inourpriorwork,weidentifiedfivekeyprinciplesforworkforceplanning:(1)involvingtopmanagementandemployees,(2)identifyingcriticalskillneeds,(3)developingworkforcestrategiestofilltheskillgaps,(4)buildingthecapabilityneededtosupportworkforcestrategies,and(5)evaluatingandrevisingthosestrategies.Inaseparatereport,wedescribedfourcomponentsofeffectivetraininganddevelopment.Oneofthecomponents—planning/front-endanalysisoftraining—includedpracticesforidentifyingskillneedsandskillgaps.SeeGAO,HumanCapital:KeyPrinciplesforEffectiveStrategicWorkforcePlanning,

GAO-04-39

(Washington,D.C.:Dec.11,2003),andHumanCapital:AGuideforAssessingStrategicTrainingandDevelopmentEffortsintheFederalGovernment,

GAO-04-546G

(Washington,D.C.:Mar.1,2004).

8Inthisreport,weusetheword“skills”torefertobothskillsandcompetencies.Inourpriorwork,wehavedefinedcompetenciestobeobservable,measurablesetsofcriticalskills,knowledge,abilities,behaviors,andothercharacteristicsanindividualneedstosuccessfullyperformworkrolesoroccupationalfunctions.

95C.F.R.§250.204.

105C.F.R.§§250.204(a)(3),250.201.

11TheFederalInformationSecurityModernizationActof2014(Pub.L.No.113-283,128Stat.3073)largelysupersededtheFederalInformationSecurityManagementActof2002(FISMA2002),enactedasTitleIII,E-GovernmentActof2002(Pub.L.No.107-347,116Stat.2899,2946).OMB,ManagingInformationasaStrategicResource,CircularNo.A-130(Washington,D.C.:July28,2016).NIST,RiskManagementFrameworkforInformationSystemsandOrganizations:ASystemLifeCycleApproachforSecurityandPrivacy,SpecialPublication(SP)800-37,Revision2(December2018).NIST,SecurityandPrivacyControlsforInformationSystemsandOrganizations,SP800-53,Rev.5(September2020).

Page5GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

keyelementsofaneffectiveinformationsecurityprogramoutlinedinFISMA2014,includingthoseidentifiedbyOMBandNISTasessentialactivitiesformanagingagencysecurityrisks.Forourassessment,wegavearatingof“Addressed”ifNTSB’sactionsaddressedallportionsofthekeypractice;“Partiallyaddressed”ifNTSB’sactionsaddressedsome,butnotall,portionsofthekeypractice;and“Notaddressed”ifNTSB’sactionsdidnotaddressanyportionofthekeypractice.WealsointerviewedNTSBofficialsregardinganygapsweidentifiedinitspoliciesandprocedures.

WeconductedthisperformanceauditfromMarch2022toAugust2023inaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedgovernmentauditingstandards.Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformtheaudittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.Webelievethattheevidenceobtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.

Background

NTSB—asanindependentestablishmentoftheUnitedStatesGovernment—hasamissiontomaketransportationsaferbyconductingindependentaccidentinvestigationsandadvocatingforsafetyimprovements.

12

Underfederalstatute,NTSB’sresponsibilitytoinvestigateaccidentsvariesbytransportationmode.NTSBisrequired,forexample,toinvestigateallcivilaviationaccidents,andallrailroadandpipelineaccidentsthatresultinfatalities.

13

Forhighwaycrashes,NTSBmayinitiateaninvestigationatitsdiscretion.Indeterminingwhethertoinvestigateanaccident,NTSBofficialstoldusthatofficialsconsiderfourquestions:(1)Aretherenationalsafetyissues,asopposedtosite-specificissues?(2)Doesthecrashinvolveemergingtechnologiesorsafetyissues,oraretheyontheNTSB’sMostWantedListofTransportation

12NTSB’smissionalsoincludesdecidingpilots’andmariners’certificationappeals;servingastheappellateauthorityforenforcementactionsinvolvingaviationandmarinercertificatesissuedbytheFederalAviationAdministrationandU.S.CoastGuard;andadjudicatingappealsofcivilpenaltyactionstakenbytheFederalAviationAdministration.

1349U.S.C.§§1131(a)(1)(A),1131(a)(1)(C).NTSBdoesnotinvestigateallsuchrailorpipelineaccidentsasrequiredbyfederalstatute,dueto,forexample,limitedagencyresourcesorlimitedsafetybenefitsofaninvestigation,accordingtoofficials.NTSBisrequiredtoannuallyreportalistofaccidentsfromthepriorcalendaryearthatitwasrequiredtoinvestigatebutdidnot,andtoexplainwhyitdidnotdoso.Fromfiscalyears2017through2021,NTSBreported8,958suchaccidents,andouranalysisshowsthat99percentwereclassifiedas“railroad”accidents.“Railroad”accidents,perNTSB’sdata,includeaccidentsinvolvingpassengertrains,railroadtrespasserfatalities,andfreightaccidents.

Page6GAO-23-105853NTSBManagementandOperations

SafetyImprovements?

14

(3)Isthereapotentialforsafetyrecommendations,andwouldNTSBinvolvementhavethepotentialtoeffectchange?(4)DoesNTSBhavetheresources(i.e.,staffavailabilityandcapacity)?

NTSBinvestigatorsanalyzeinformationobtainedfromthesceneoftheaccident,aswellasfromothersources,andstaffthenprepareanaccidentinvestigationreport.Oncefinalized,thisreportmayincludesafetyrecommendationsthataddressissuesuncoveredduringinvestigationsandspecifyactionstohelppreventsimilaraccidentsfromoccurringinthefuture.Theserecommendationsareaddressedtotheorganizationsbestabletotakecorrectiveaction,suchastheU.S.DepartmentofTransportationanditsmodaladministrations,someofwhichalsoconductorparticipateinaccidentinvestigations;otherfederalandstateagencies;manufacturers;andoperators.AccordingtoNTSB,NTSBdoesnothavetheauthoritytorequireimplementationofitsrecommendationsbutencouragesactionstoaddressthem,suchasthroughpublicationoftheMostWantedListofTransportationSafetyImprovements.NTSBalsoconductssafetyresearchstudiesandoffersinformationandotherassistancetofamilymembersandsurvivorsforanyaccidentitinvestigates.

NTSBhasfourofficesthatinvestigateaccidentsbytransportationmode,referredtoas“modaloffices.”ThelargestmodalofficeistheOfficeofAviationSafety;theofficesofHighwaySafety,MarineSafety,andRailroad,PipelineandHazardousMa